Asset Forfeiture: R. v. Harmer-Elers

  

Police are looking to seize a Mongrel Mob pad in Southland, not as proceeds of crime, but as an ‘instrument’ used to facilitate a kidnapping, part of an internal gang dispute.

This use of the Sentencing Act is under challenge.

In 2025, Turoirangi Atarea Harmer-Elers was convicted, with others, on charges of assault and kidnapping following an altercation during a Mongrel Mob disciplinary session at their gang headquarters on Albion Street, in Matuara.

Application for a forced sale of Albion Street was made by Police after he was sentenced.

At a preliminary hearing, Harmer-Elders said the court could not impose a Sentencing Act ‘instrument’ seizure when final sentence had been pronounced at an earlier hearing.

Sentencing was ‘done and dusted.’

Justice Gordon ruled there is no wording in the Act stopping an ‘instrument’ forfeiture order being made after sentencing.  An earlier sentence can be recalled and modified in light of any subsequent asset forfeiture, she said.   

Sentencing Act asset forfeiture orders are possible on conviction of any offence punishable by five years’ imprisonment or more.  Property used to facilitate the offence can be seized.

R. v. Harmer-Elers – High Court (26.11.25)

26.024

FX Losses: Zero Markets v. Konnectivity

  

Jinwoo Kim’s Konnectivity Ltd failed to offload foreign exchange losses, claiming unsuccessfully these were ‘expenses’ incurred acting as a conduit for customers placing funds with online trading platform Zero Markets LLC.

Konnectivity could not set off its USD $80,200 foreign exchange losses against admin fees it owed Zero.

The plain commercial interpretation of ‘expenses’ in its contract with Zero did not include foreign exchange losses incurred on client accounts, the High Court ruled.

Auckland-based Konnectivity is a payment service provider allowing clients to set up personal accounts for onward investment.

Foreign exchange losses arose when converting Korean won to cryptocurrency.

Mr Kim denied Konnectivity’s claimed losses had arisen from speculative trading on its own account using funds held collectively on behalf of clients.

He said substantial losses arose on one client transaction during the conversion of client funds from Korean won to US dollar-equivalent ‘coins;’ part of a client investment with Zero Markets.

There could be up to twenty four hours between this conversion and Zero Market’s daily ‘sweep’ updating client cryptocurrency accounts.

Konnectivity said its USD denominated exchange loss was the cost of making good the client’s loss for the difference in value between the time of conversion and the time the client’s cryptocurrency account was later credited with Zero Markets.

Konnectivity said this loss was a ‘settlement expense.’  Zero Markets had agreed to accept liability for settlement expenses under their contract, it said.

In the High Court, Justice Harvey ruled a plain meaning of the word ‘expense’ did not include foreign exchange losses.

Konnectivity had complete control over how it backed its client reserves, he said.  It could have hedged against adverse currency movements.

Zero Markets was in no position to monitor Konnectivity’s potential exposure.

Sophisticated commercial parties are unlikely to have contracted for foreign exchange losses (but not gains) to lie with Zero Markets, he said.

Konnectivity was ordered to pay the USD $80,200 still owed Zero Markets.

Zero Markets LLC v. Konnectivity Ltd – High Court (26.11.25)

26.026

 

Loan: Chen v. Goodmore Investments

  

Having deceived multiple financiers by having each believe they had first ranking security in an Auckland property development, Liyun Chen then unsuccessfully sought court intervention claiming loan contracts were ‘oppressive,’ with consumer credit legislation applying because loans in part were used to refinance her prior private borrowing.

The Court of Appeal ruled Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act rules did not apply.  The loans were business transactions for business purposes.  Mandatory consumer protection disclosures were not required.

As guarantor of the loans, Ms Chen was ordered to pay shortfalls owed second-tier property financiers: $766,000 owed Goodmore Investments; $1.1 million owed Tawa Trade Finance.  In addition, there is default interest at between twenty-five per cent and twenty-eight per cent running on unpaid balances.

Goodmore’s loan was the first, in early 2021: a short-term loan of $4.54 million to refinance then current borrowings and to complete a property development on Umbria Lane in Manukau.

Multiple properties across Auckland owned by Ms Chen or her family trust were provided as collateral security, plus Ms Chen’s guarantee.

The court was told interest payments were often late.  The loan was not repaid on due date.

Sale of mortgaged properties enabled partial repayment.  The eventual $766,000 shortfall followed a forced sale of the incomplete Umbria Road project.

The Court of Appeal ruled the Goodmore loan was not a personal loan.  Its predominate purpose was business; property development.

It was artificial for Ms Chen to subdivide this loan into two purposes: business and personal.

Using some of Goodmore’s money to repay a personal loan was in effect the refinancing of prior personal business borrowing, given Ms Chen’s extensive programme of property developments in both New Zealand and China.

A second loan, for $1.7 million from Tawa Trade Finance, was made mid-2022.

Tawa was unaware that security offered for the loan were properties already pledged earlier to another financier: General Finance Ltd.  Ms Chen did not disclose that General had been given priority, with an agreement to mortgage signed several months previously.

On default, Tawa was left with $1.1 million unpaid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed claims by Ms Chen that the Tawa loan was also a consumer credit loan and could be challenged under consumer finance legislation.

The fact one of the borrowers was a Chen family trust did not make a business loan a personal loan.

Similarly, a term of the Tawa loan prohibiting GST registration by Ms Chen did not affect the status of the loan as a business loan.  Some of the properties supposedly offered to Tawa as collateral security were owned by Ms Chen personally, or her family trust.  Tawa was concerned about ‘loan to value’ ratios in its lending.  It did not want to see Ms Chen or her family trust registering for GST as property developers.  This would result in fifteen per cent of any later sale payable as GST, reducing Tawa’s recovery on sale.

Chen v. Goodmore Investments (NZ) Ltd & Chen v. Tawa Trade Finance Ltd – Court of Appeal (26.11.25)

26.025

Professional Standards: Woodroffe v. Auckland Standards Committee

  

With seven previous disciplinary findings against her for unsatisfactory professional conduct, Auckland lawyer Olinda Woodroffe now has been fined $10,000 and ordered to repay client fees after a Law Society Standards Committee found she improperly identified and criticised a client in an Auckland radio broadcast having previously acted in a rude and threatening manner towards him.

On appeal, the High Court upheld both the Standards Committee ruling of professional misconduct and the penalty imposed.  The client was not named.

Ms Woodroffe practises law in both New Zealand and Samoa.

The client dispute had its origins in a New Zealand-based Samoan’s request that Ms Woodroffe challenge a transaction in Samoa where land in family customary ownership had been leased to a church.

Mediation was unsuccessful.  After legal proceedings were filed in Samoa, Ms Woodroffe’s client received a court order demanding he pay about NZ$35,000 into court as security for defendant’s costs, should he lose.

Unable to bear these costs, the client wrote to Ms Woodroffe expressing dismay that she had not warned him of this potential added financial burden.  He later abandoned his intended Samoa litigation.

The High Court was told Ms Woodroffe replied to her client stating she had advised him ‘many times’ of a possible court order requiring security for costs, stating his comments to the contrary were defamatory and false.  Legal action was threatened.

Letters from clients to their solicitors are private and privileged communications.  There was no basis on which the client’s letter to her could amount to defamation, Justice MacGillivray said.  It was both highly unprofessional and misleading to respond to her client in such a fashion, he said.

Separately, the client wrote to the Supreme Court in Samoa asking for a concession, repeating that Ms Woodroffe had not told him about potential liability to provide security for costs upfront.  Learning of this, Ms Woodroffe wrote to her client demanding he retract comments made to the court, or she would sue.  This was described in the High Court as oppressive behaviour, amounting to a demand her client lie in order to protect her reputation.         

Speaking on an Auckland Samoan-language radio station she broadcast a supposedly hypothetical narrative for listeners drawing a distinction between security for costs prior to any court hearing and liability to pay costs after an unsuccessful hearing, indirectly identifying her client when disclosing the fact of her threats to sue an unnamed client.  Extended family familiar with the litigation in Samoa recognised her client immediately from this broadcast.

It was dishonourable for Ms Woodroffe to have publicly criticised her client and breached client confidentiality in her radio broadcast, Justice MacGillivray said.

Neither the Standards Committee nor the High Court accepted Ms Woodroffe’s claim to have previously advised her client about potential pre-trial personal liability over security for costs.  

Ms Woodroffe’s claim the Standards Committee has no jurisdiction over conduct of litigation in Samoa was dismissed.  Her client lives in New Zealand.  Agreement to act for the client was made in New Zealand.  A local Standards Committee had jurisdiction to review her conduct.

In addition to a $10,000 fine and repayment of $10,000 fees received in advance, Ms Woodroffe was ordered to pay some $46,000 for costs of the Law Society investigation and disciplinary hearing.

Woodroffe v. Auckland Standards Committee 3 – High Court (24.11.25)

26.020

Current Account: Culturesafe NZ v. Halse

  

High profile employee advocate Allan Halse has been ordered to repay $165,000 drawn down from his company Culturesafe NZ Ltd, now in liquidation insolvent.

Culturesafe was ordered into liquidation by the High Court in August 2022 following failure to pay a $67,000 costs order imposed by the Employment Court. 

Mr Halse was ordered jointly liable to pay these costs.  In October 2022, he personally paid the $67,000 debt to avoid being bankrupted.

Meanwhile, he had lost control of his Hamilton-based company; now in the hands of liquidators.

They identified that the company’s major asset is a loan to Mr Halse, in the form of current account drawings where Mr Halse had used company cash to meet personal expenses.

He disputed owing his company any money.  He claimed to be unpaid for holiday pay and overtime, plus hours worked, given that he had never drawn a salary.  Personal drawings from the company bank account were payment for work done on behalf of his company, he claimed.

Companies Act rules governing ‘one-man’ companies require payment for work done on behalf of their company be confirmed, with a formal resolution approving a shareholder salary or director remuneration plus a supporting certificate stating that this payment is ‘fair and reasonable.’

The High Court was told Mr Halse failed to arrange this paperwork whilst in control of his company.  Payments he received were unsecured borrowings, repayable on demand.

To prove the amount due, liquidators relied on the dollar amount of shareholder drawings, marked as a debt owed to Culturesafe, in financial statements approved by Mr Halse and filed with Inland Revenue for tax purposes.  Adjustments were made for subsequent drawings, post-balance date.

Justice Andrew ordered Mr Halse pay Culturesafe liquidators $165,200 in repayment of his overdrawn shareholder current account.

Separately, Mr Halse claimed a set-off; being given credit for the $67,000 adverse costs order he paid personally, for which Culturesafe was also liable.

For a set-off to apply, Companies Act insolvency rules required Mr Halse as director to prove his company was not insolvent in the two years prior to payment he made on Culturesafe’s behalf.  Clearly, Culturesafe was insolvent when payment was made, Justice Andrew said.

Culturesafe NZ Ltd v. Halse – High Court (24.11.25)

26.022

Name Supression: Commissioner of Police v. Chandra & Prasad

  

Name suppression was refused for Girish Chandra and Rameet Prasad who negotiated a $986,000 proceeds of crime settlement for their part in a social welfare fraud, cashing out benefit payments disbursed as payment for essential furniture.

Police forensic accounting staff looked at two million dollars worth of social welfare benefits processed over a six year period by Auckland-based company, ABC Furniture & Appliances Ltd.  The 2019 investigation uncovered a fraudulent ‘cash-back’ scheme with social welfare beneficiaries receiving cash instead of furniture as required by ABC Furniture’s then contract with Social Development.

Messrs Chandra and Prasad controlled ABC Furniture.

In a court-approved Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act settlement, they agreed to surrender $986,000 as proceeds of crime.  The agreed settlement specifically stated there was no admission as to criminal liability.

The two sought name suppression, arguing their names and their business would be improperly painted as being party to criminal activity when no crime had been proved or admitted.

Police said the effect of a court-approved out of court settlement is to judicially recognise that named individuals have unlawfully benefitted from significant criminal activity.

In the High Court, Justice Gardiner said Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act settlements are civil proceedings.  Normal rules for name suppression apply.  There is a presumption in favour of publication; a principle of open justice.

Name suppression requires evidence of specific adverse consequences likely to follow publication.

In this case, claims of potential social stigma and reputational damage are insufficient, Justice Gardiner said.  These are an ordinary consequence of their court proceedings being published.

Messrs Chandra and Prasad had not met the high standard required for proof of adverse consequences, she ruled.

It is in the public interest for customers of ABC Furniture to be aware of the company’s past role in misappropriation of public funds, she said.

Commissioner of Police v. Chandra & Prasad – High Court (24.11.25)

26.021

Bankruptcy: Coupe v. R

  

With a cavalier disregard for rules prohibiting undischarged bankrupts operating a business, twice bankrupt Aaron Coupe (also known as Aaron McGregor) was described as a very active and glib salesman of ridiculous business schemes.  He misled creditors by using an alias and hid from Insolvency Service money owed bankruptcy creditors.

Over a fifteen year period, he ignored rules prohibiting him from running a business or acting as a company director.

Creditors went unpaid, while he hid money in his mother’s bank account.

He is currently appealing a Companies Act sentence of four years five months imprisonment for acting as a company director when disqualified. 

Disqualification as a company director was automatic after his earlier 2016 Insolvency Act conviction for running a business whilst bankrupt.

This Companies Act conviction followed a failed project to build a luxury hotel in Auckland to be called The Liberte, and a further failed project to develop a chain of hotels under the brand Tomorrow Hotels.

Company creditors were left owed some three million dollars.

After being found guilty of Companies Act breaches following a jury trial, he failed to show up for sentencing.  Arrested and brought before the court, he was sentenced in 2025 to the four year five month’s imprisonment, now under appeal.

Separately, he appealed a different 2025 conviction: a three year nine month’s sentence, convicted of Insolvency Act offences for running a business and concealing assets whilst bankrupt for a second time.

These convictions arose from construction projects Coupe managed during the period of his second bankruptcy; projects left unfinished, and owners left stranded.

Two of his customers lost their life savings, left living in a caravan on their property with a botched home renovation leaving their home uninhabitable.

Evidence was given of Coupe taking some $1.7 million from customers whilst bankrupt, money both spent on living expenses and hidden from Insolvency Services.

At this point, he had paid only $25,000 of a $75,100 reparations order negotiated as part of sentencing for Insolvency Act convictions following his first bankruptcy.  A reparations agreement which at that time saw him receiving a more lenient sentence of home detention, the court was told.

Back in the High Court, Justice Gardiner reduced his most recent Insolvency Act sentence by forty per cent.

His two separate sentences in 2025 for breaches respectively of the Companies Act and the Insolvency Act must be served cumulatively, not concurrently.

Taking a wider picture, Justice Gardiner ruled current combined sentences of over eight year’s imprisonment for the accumulated offences was too severe, even given the seriousness of Coupe’s fifteen years offending.

Coupe v. R – High Court (24.11.25)

26.023

Subdivision: Wakefield Group v. Kapiti Coast

  

Kapiti District Council was ordered to reconsider roading access for a new subdivision after a narrow majority of councillors voted down a pro forma request for state highway access; arguing that there was no community need for further housing and that developers were interested only in profit.

High Court ruled this decision was premised on a false fact: that a Council ‘green belt’ policy operated to protect community values.  There was no such policy.

In 2007, what became known as the Fleming subdivision was formed at Otaki, bordering state highway one.  What is Lot 72 at the end of Moy Place was vested in the Council as a local purpose ‘road’ reserve.  No road was actually formed.  The reserve was planted in trees and grass, becoming a playground.

In 2021, property developer Wakefield Group commenced work on a neighbouring 137 lot subdivision.  This development required road access through the reserve.  Moy Place residents objected.  What is currently a quiet cul-de-sac would become a through road.

The High Court was told Moy Place had been constructed wider than otherwise necessary to allow for future use as a through road.

Without road access being opened, Wakefield’s project would stall.  

The High Court was told of a Kapiti District Council meeting in late 2024 where Wakefield Group submitted formal request for the existing road reserve to be dedicated as a road.

Resource management consent had been granted some six months previously, fast-tracked through the Environmental Protection Agency as part of covid-19 recovery legislation.

Final steps required Council to formally agree to dedication of lot 72 as a legal road.

Five councillors voted in favour; six against.

Wakefield Group claimed in the High Court this narrow majority were using a power to approve roading for an ulterior purpose; blocking a planned subdivision.

It asked for a High Court review.  Judicial review does not reconsider merits of a Council decision; it looks at the process by which the decision was reached.

Justice Gendall ruled the Council decision was marred by an error of fact: speakers for the majority justified their vote against as preserving community benefits through enforcement of a Council ‘green belt’ policy.  Since there was no such policy in place, votes against were made on the basis of a factual error.

Land set aside under the Reserves Act for use as a ‘road’ can only be formally designated as some form of road, accessway or service lane, Justice Gendall ruled.  It was an error of law for councillors to consider extraneous political issues in deciding alternative uses for the designated land.

Council’s decision was quashed.

It was ordered to look again at the question of redesignating Moy Place road reserve as a legal road.

Wakefield Group Holdings Ltd v. Kapiti Coast District Council – High Court (21.11.25)

26.019

Trustee: re Mataraua B

  

Struck off for misappropriating client funds, former lawyer Junior Lambert Witehira was not suitable to act as trustee of Ngai Tawake Marae near Kaikohe, the Maori Land Court ruled.

At a 2021 annual general meeting, Mr Witehira was elected as one of the Marae trustees.

A fellow trustee questioned his appointment, claiming Mr Witehira was not eligible having ticked a consent form box falsely stating: ‘I do not have any criminal convictions for dishonesty or any other offences that may disqualify me from being a trustee.’

Mr Witehira told the Maori Land Court he did not have any criminal convictions for dishonesty; a decade previously there had been investigations into operation of his law firm’s trust account, he said.

A report later provided by the Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal identified that Mr Witehira had misappropriated client funds on two separate occasions, using client funds totalling some $23,700 for his own benefit.

The Tribunal struck Mr Witehira from the roll of solicitors in 2012.

In the Maori Land Court, Judge Armstrong said a high level of trust is required from marae trustees.  They hold land, cash and other marae assets in trust for members.

Whilst Mr Witehira was not convicted of dishonesty, he attempted to mislead the court by wrongly stating that he had never misappropriated client money, Judge Armstrong said.

Mr Witehira lacks the honesty and integrity to act as a marae trustee, Judge Armstrong said.

re Mataraua B 5B1A – Maori Land Court (21.11.25)

26.016

Executor: Wilson v. Albert

  

Appointed as executor of his late mother’s estate, William Albert did a good job of calling in available liquid assets and distributing proceeds to beneficiaries, but acted as if their Wairoa family home as the remaining estate asset was his alone, refusing to pay for it.  The High Court removed him as executor, appointing the Public Trust in his place and with it power to sell the home.

His mother Mokai Kate Albert died in 2021.  Her will named as beneficiaries her biological son William together with two others adopted into the family as whangai adoptions: Jimmy and Kelly.  All three are to share equally in her estate.

The High Court was told William as executor cashed up his mother’s bank accounts and life insurance, realising some $41,000 which was split three ways between the beneficiaries.

This left their mother’s McLean Street home, occupied by William; valued in 2025 at about $299,000.

Kelly lives in Australia; Jimmy in Wairoa.

Jimmy told the High Court that indications by William that he would buy the family home have come to nothing.  There was no evidence that William is paying rent whilst living at McLean Street, or paying rates, or keeping the property insured.

On Jimmy’s application, Justice Gendall used Administration Act powers to remove William as executor, appointing the Public Trust.

William did not file any statement of defence.  He was ordered to pay all legal costs incurred removing him as executor, to be deducted from his one third share on sale of McLean Street.

Wilson v. Albert – High Court (21.11.25)

26.018

Family Trusts: Cook v. Hair

  

Part of bitter and hostile litigation following end of their twenty year relationship, Anna Cook complains two family trusts holding millions of dollars in assets set up by former partner Ian Hair are primarily supporting Mr Hair financially while leaving her in the cold.  The High Court removed all trustees, appointing an independent trustee required to take an even-handed approach to beneficiary requests.   

Both Ms Cook and Mr Hair are discretionary beneficiaries of two family trusts: the Hair Family Trust and the Murian Trust.

Ms Cook says Hair Family owns an extensive portfolio of residential properties; Murian a residential property in Takapuna she describes as being worth more than six million dollars.

The two trusts are controlled by Mr Hair and Auckland lawyer Douglas Burgess.

A bitter relationship property dispute in the Family Court spilled over into the High Court with Ms Cook complaining trust assets are being used to support Mr Hair’s litigation costs, while she is forced to live hand-to-mouth, struggling to support herself and their son.

Evidence was given of pleas to the trustees for financial support being either ignored or fobbed off with replies stating there were currently insufficient funds available.

Ms Cook claims some $500,000 from trust sources were made available to Mr Hair for payment of legal fees.

Justice Wilkinson-Smith ruled that Mr Hair had used his position as trustee to benefit himself personally and to disadvantage Ms Cook.  Mr Burgess as the current independent trustee had been unable to act with sufficient independence, given his relationship with Mr Hair, she said.

Both were removed as trustee on grounds that Mr Hair’s conflict of interest led to a lack of impartiality; replaced by Comac Trustees as sole trustee.

In addition, Ms Cook asked that terms of each Trust be amended to remove Mr Hair as ‘appointer,’ and with it his power to unilaterally name new trustees and beneficiaries.

As appointer, Mr Hair could circumvent the court order appointing Comac Trustees, she said.

Declining to change trust wording, Justice Wilkinson-Smith warned Mr Hair he would be answerable to the court if his power of appointment were used contrary to the current court ruling.

Cook v. Hair – High Court (21.11.25)

26.017

Sale: Sidey v. Ngatapa Ltd

  

There is no binding agreement until there is a binding agreement the Court of Appeal emphasised, ruling Rakaia-based Mark Cox and Sarah Dods were free to terminate a $7.75 million farm deal and sell to a higher buyer after Mick Sidey dallied too long in exercising a due diligence clause.

The court dismissed Mr Sidey’s claim that his contract had been affirmed, giving him ongoing rights as first buyer.

In July 2025, Mr Sidey signed up to buy a 198 hectare farm on Coutts Island Road in Christchurch from Ngatapa Ltd, a company controlled by Mr Cox and Ms Dods.   

A due diligence clause gave Mr Sidey fifteen working days to complete his assessment of the intended purchase.  By agreement, this due diligence period was extended, twice.

Three days after the second extension expired, the two sides were still finalising details: transfer of irrigation rights, the status of past insurance claims for earthquake damage, and permission to truck in stock for grazing prior to contract settlement date.

With these details apparently sorted out, lawyers for Ngatapa asked for email confirmation that all was agreed, before the original written contract was amended and circulated for signature.

The court was told email confirmation was provided, but Ngatapa instead terminated the deal before the initial contract was amended and signed, selling elsewhere for a better price.

Mr Sidey claimed Ngatapa’s request for an email response confirming final details amounted to an affirmation of the otherwise expired contract; his contract to buy still stood, he said.

This interchange was no more than another step in ongoing negotiations, the Court of Appeal ruled.  The prior contract was no longer held open awaiting completion of due diligence.  The extended period of due diligence had expired.  Ngatapa was free to sell elsewhere.

Sidey v. Ngatapa Ltd – Court of Appeal (20.11.25)

26.015

Family Trust: Nath v. Nath

  

What started as a prudent decision to place their South Auckland family home into trust as protection against business creditors turned into a sibling standoff with Roneel Nath treating the Alfriston property as his own; not paying rent to the trust, allowing the property to run down, and failing to account for rent paid by tenants occupying a smaller dwelling on site.

Justice Gault ordered the property be sold and the Nath Brothers Family Trust wound up. 

Roneel and brother Vicky Nath are the two trustees.  They are named, together with their mother Sunil Lata, as the Trust’s primary beneficiaries.

The High Court was told their family trust was established in 2013.  Initially, it operated as an investment trust; buying and later selling a property in Mangere East.   

In 2016, the family home on Everlea Place was transferred into the Trust.

Their mother continued living there after transfer to trust ownership, together with son Roneel and his family. 

A decade later, the relationship between brothers Roneel and Vicky had become decidedly frosty.

Claims Roneel was letting the property fall into disrepair and failing to account for rentals received were major points of friction.

Vicky said his brother refused to enter into discussions.  He refused to countenance any winding up of their Trust, Vicky said.

The High Court was told their mother supported Vicky’s plans to terminate the Trust.

With the trustees deadlocked, Justice Gault used Trusts Act powers to order a sale of Everlea Place and termination of the Trust.

Evidence was given that net equity in Everlea Place is some $2.2 million.

Justice Gault ordered payments be made from proceeds of sale to reimburse beneficiary loans made to the Trust: Vicky ($311,050); Roneel ($141,912); and their mother ($265,520).

He further ordered reimbursement of any expenses incurred by Vicky and his mother on repairs to put the property into a saleable state, up to a maximum of $95,000 as set out in a repair schedule presented to the court.

The net balance is to be divided three ways between the major beneficiaries: Sunil Lata and her two sons.

Roneel was ordered to provide a verified statement of account for rentals received from the minor dwelling on the property.  Should he fail to do so, Vicky and his mother are to each receive $105 for every week the dwelling was rented out, deducted from Roneel’s share on termination of the Trust.

Roneel did not defend his brother’s court application to wind up the Trust.

Nath v. Nath – High Court (20.11.25)

26.014

Trespass: Pipiriki Township v. Cripps

  

Maori Land Court referenced concepts of mana inherent in ownership of Maori Land, departing from English land law concepts of trespass, when ordering Jay Cripps pack up and leave his unauthorised commercial campsite, operating on the Whanganui River near Pipiriki.

The court was told Jay Cripps has been squatting on the site for over a decade.  Ownership lies with local Maori incorporation: Pipiriki Township No 1.

The legal difficulty facing Pipiriki Township, seeking to force Mr Cripps out, is that the campsite is on land currently leased for forestry on a 99 year lease to Waimarino Forests Ltd.

Pipiriki Township faced an apparently unsurmountable legal hurdle: land law rules inherited from England hinder owners of leased land seeking to trespass anyone.  A lease gives the lessee rights of possession; it is for the lessee to enforce its rights of possession by suing squatters for trespass.

Waimarino Forests told the Maori Land Court that while no permission had been given Mr Cripps to operate his commercial campsite on the leased land, it was not interested as lessee in incurring legal expenses ejecting him.  Ultimate ownership of Waimarino lies with investors in British Virgin Islands and Singapore.

In the Maori Land Court, Judge Warren pointed out that the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act imported into New Zealand statute law concepts of Maori tikanga going beyond the English law concept of land ownership simply being control over an economic asset.

For Maori, land in customary ownership is more than just an economic asset; it reflects the genealogy, the history and the mana of its current owners. 

Having Mr Cripps operate a business on leased Pipiriki land, without Maori landowners’ consent, caused spiritual and reputational damage to Pipiriki owners, Judge Warren said.

Pipiriki had no control over how Mr Cripps cared for their land or told their stories.

Departing from the general law of trespass, Judge Warren ruled Pipiriki Township could sue to trespass Mr Cripps from his campsite, despite Pipiriki having no rights of possession to the land during Waimarino Forests’ 99 year lease.

Mr Cripps was given two months to clear all structures from the site, and ordered to then leave permanently.

Pipiriki Township No. 1 Inc v. Cripps – Maori Land Court (19.11.25)

26.013

Investment: South Hyde Consulting v. SPSS Group

  

Initially it looked like a match made in heaven with Glenn Jenkin’s SPSS Group linking up with Tim Blake’s South Hyde Consulting, given their joint interest in sporting apparel and outdoor activities.  It fell apart within months.

Tim Blake promotes hunting and walking tours based out of Kaikoura.  Glenn Jenkins specialises in sports, fitness and apparel brands.

The two joined forces in a series of agreements culminating in a 2023 deal seeing Blake’s South Hyde agreeing to put up $200,000 as its share of a limited liability partnership.

The deal quickly collapsed.

At the start, South Hyde was required to front with only $175,000 cash of its promised $200,000; the balance ‘paid’ by way of Mr Blake taking a $25,000 salary sacrifice.

The District Court was told early enthusiasm turned to disillusionment.

Mr Blake was taken on at a $100,000 salary.  Mr Jenkins alleged poor profitability was caused by Mr Blake’s overspending and poor decision-making.

For Mr Jenkins, the last straw was Mr Blake’s South Hyde suing to recover its $200,000 investment.

Investment terms gave South Hyde a put option; requiring Mr Jenkin’s SPSS Group to buy it out of the partnership at $200,000 if demanded at any time within the first twelve months.

There was no dispute this put option was valid.

Mr Jenkins countered that Mr Blake’s departure from the business within six months was in breach of his employment contract; damages for poor performance and early departure should be set off against any return of the $200,000 investment.

Mr Jenkins personally argued his case.

Judge Hunt ruled Mr Jenkins had failed to recognise the investment deal was entirely separate from Mr Blake’s employment contract.

Mr Blake’s employment contract, whatever its terms, was between Mr Blake and their investment vehicle of choice: the limited liability partnership.

The put option was between different parties: investors SPSS Group and South Hyde; parties separate from the disputed employment contract.

Terms of their original investment did not set out conditions for employment of Mr Blake.

No counter claim could apply.  A counter claim requires mutuality.

SPSS was ordered to pay the $200,000 due South Hyde under its put option, regardless of any separate employment dispute between their partnership and Mr Blake.

South Hyde Consulting & Investments Ltd v. Speed Power & Stability Systems Manufacturing Ltd – District Court (18.11.25)

26.012

Fraud: Kea Investments Ltd v. Wikeley

  

Ken Wikeley failed in his attempt to avoid contempt of court charges and bankruptcy, seeking a court-brokered deal.  He is seemingly left as the fall guy in a fraudulent transaction allegedly cooked up by entrepreneur Eric Watson and apparently designed to siphon funds from Sir Owen Glenn’s Kea Investments.

Kea Investments Ltd has launched litigation in three different countries to unwind what New Zealand courts ruled was a fraudulently obtained US court order by Wikeley’s family trust after a Kentucky court ordered Kea pay USD123 million, supposedly for breach of contract.  No such debt is owed, New Zealand courts ruled.

The presence of Eric Watson lurks in the background, with allegations he engineered the fraud.

In separate litigation, in the United Kingdom, Mr Watson is strongly resisting payment of GBP129 million an England court ordered he pay Sir Owen.

Currently, Mr Wikeley has lost control of his family trust, now in the hands of interim liquidators.  He faces contempt of court charges filed in Queensland and is threatened with bankruptcy for non-payment of court-ordered costs.  His Australian passport has been impounded, preventing travel.

Desperate to extricate himself from this legal morass, Mr Wikeley asked the High Court in New Zealand to convene a judicial settlement conference to approve a possible settlement.

High Court rules allow litigants to negotiate an out of court settlement presided over by a judge.  This can short-cut both court-scheduling delays and expensive drawn-out court hearings.

Judicial settlement conferences are not common.  By the time a dispute is ready for trial, both sides are at daggers drawn; compromise is unlikely.

Justice Gault refused to order a judicial settlement conference.

Kea Investments was not interested.  It is looking to enforce current court rulings against Mr Wikeley.

The High Court was told Mr Wikeley is offering to have the fraudulent Kentucky court ruling overturned, saving Kea the expense of proving in a US court all the facts already heard by a New Zealand court; this support in return for Kea Investments abandoning all current litigation against him personally.

The fraudulent Kentucky litigation was not taken in the name of Mr Wikeley personally; it is in the name of his Wikeley Family Trust.  This Trust was not part of the proposed judicial settlement conference.  Mr Wikeley no longer controls his family trust.  It would not be bound by any promises he made to have the Kentucky court ruling overturned, Justice Gault said.

Kea Investments Ltd v. Wikeley – High Court (17.11.25)

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