Professional Standards: Woodroffe v. Auckland Standards Committee

  

With seven previous disciplinary findings against her for unsatisfactory professional conduct, Auckland lawyer Olinda Woodroffe now has been fined $10,000 and ordered to repay client fees after a Law Society Standards Committee found she improperly identified and criticised a client in an Auckland radio broadcast having previously acted in a rude and threatening manner towards him.

On appeal, the High Court upheld both the Standards Committee ruling of professional misconduct and the penalty imposed.  The client was not named.

Ms Woodroffe practises law in both New Zealand and Samoa.

The client dispute had its origins in a New Zealand-based Samoan’s request that Ms Woodroffe challenge a transaction in Samoa where land in family customary ownership had been leased to a church.

Mediation was unsuccessful.  After legal proceedings were filed in Samoa, Ms Woodroffe’s client received a court order demanding he pay about NZ$35,000 into court as security for defendant’s costs, should he lose.

Unable to bear these costs, the client wrote to Ms Woodroffe expressing dismay that she had not warned him of this potential added financial burden.  He later abandoned his intended Samoa litigation.

The High Court was told Ms Woodroffe replied to her client stating she had advised him ‘many times’ of a possible court order requiring security for costs, stating his comments to the contrary were defamatory and false.  Legal action was threatened.

Letters from clients to their solicitors are private and privileged communications.  There was no basis on which the client’s letter to her could amount to defamation, Justice MacGillivray said.  It was both highly unprofessional and misleading to respond to her client in such a fashion, he said.

Separately, the client wrote to the Supreme Court in Samoa asking for a concession, repeating that Ms Woodroffe had not told him about potential liability to provide security for costs upfront.  Learning of this, Ms Woodroffe wrote to her client demanding he retract comments made to the court, or she would sue.  This was described in the High Court as oppressive behaviour, amounting to a demand her client lie in order to protect her reputation.         

Speaking on an Auckland Samoan-language radio station she broadcast a supposedly hypothetical narrative for listeners drawing a distinction between security for costs prior to any court hearing and liability to pay costs after an unsuccessful hearing, indirectly identifying her client when disclosing the fact of her threats to sue an unnamed client.  Extended family familiar with the litigation in Samoa recognised her client immediately from this broadcast.

It was dishonourable for Ms Woodroffe to have publicly criticised her client and breached client confidentiality in her radio broadcast, Justice MacGillivray said.

Neither the Standards Committee nor the High Court accepted Ms Woodroffe’s claim to have previously advised her client about potential pre-trial personal liability over security for costs.  

Ms Woodroffe’s claim the Standards Committee has no jurisdiction over conduct of litigation in Samoa was dismissed.  Her client lives in New Zealand.  Agreement to act for the client was made in New Zealand.  A local Standards Committee had jurisdiction to review her conduct.

In addition to a $10,000 fine and repayment of $10,000 fees received in advance, Ms Woodroffe was ordered to pay some $46,000 for costs of the Law Society investigation and disciplinary hearing.

Woodroffe v. Auckland Standards Committee 3 – High Court (24.11.25)

26.020

Subdivision: Wakefield Group v. Kapiti Coast

  

Kapiti District Council was ordered to reconsider roading access for a new subdivision after a narrow majority of councillors voted down a pro forma request for state highway access; arguing that there was no community need for further housing and that developers were interested only in profit.

High Court ruled this decision was premised on a false fact: that a Council ‘green belt’ policy operated to protect community values.  There was no such policy.

In 2007, what became known as the Fleming subdivision was formed at Otaki, bordering state highway one.  What is Lot 72 at the end of Moy Place was vested in the Council as a local purpose ‘road’ reserve.  No road was actually formed.  The reserve was planted in trees and grass, becoming a playground.

In 2021, property developer Wakefield Group commenced work on a neighbouring 137 lot subdivision.  This development required road access through the reserve.  Moy Place residents objected.  What is currently a quiet cul-de-sac would become a through road.

The High Court was told Moy Place had been constructed wider than otherwise necessary to allow for future use as a through road.

Without road access being opened, Wakefield’s project would stall.  

The High Court was told of a Kapiti District Council meeting in late 2024 where Wakefield Group submitted formal request for the existing road reserve to be dedicated as a road.

Resource management consent had been granted some six months previously, fast-tracked through the Environmental Protection Agency as part of covid-19 recovery legislation.

Final steps required Council to formally agree to dedication of lot 72 as a legal road.

Five councillors voted in favour; six against.

Wakefield Group claimed in the High Court this narrow majority were using a power to approve roading for an ulterior purpose; blocking a planned subdivision.

It asked for a High Court review.  Judicial review does not reconsider merits of a Council decision; it looks at the process by which the decision was reached.

Justice Gendall ruled the Council decision was marred by an error of fact: speakers for the majority justified their vote against as preserving community benefits through enforcement of a Council ‘green belt’ policy.  Since there was no such policy in place, votes against were made on the basis of a factual error.

Land set aside under the Reserves Act for use as a ‘road’ can only be formally designated as some form of road, accessway or service lane, Justice Gendall ruled.  It was an error of law for councillors to consider extraneous political issues in deciding alternative uses for the designated land.

Council’s decision was quashed.

It was ordered to look again at the question of redesignating Moy Place road reserve as a legal road.

Wakefield Group Holdings Ltd v. Kapiti Coast District Council – High Court (21.11.25)

26.019

Trustee: re Mataraua B

  

Struck off for misappropriating client funds, former lawyer Junior Lambert Witehira was not suitable to act as trustee of Ngai Tawake Marae near Kaikohe, the Maori Land Court ruled.

At a 2021 annual general meeting, Mr Witehira was elected as one of the Marae trustees.

A fellow trustee questioned his appointment, claiming Mr Witehira was not eligible having ticked a consent form box falsely stating: ‘I do not have any criminal convictions for dishonesty or any other offences that may disqualify me from being a trustee.’

Mr Witehira told the Maori Land Court he did not have any criminal convictions for dishonesty; a decade previously there had been investigations into operation of his law firm’s trust account, he said.

A report later provided by the Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal identified that Mr Witehira had misappropriated client funds on two separate occasions, using client funds totalling some $23,700 for his own benefit.

The Tribunal struck Mr Witehira from the roll of solicitors in 2012.

In the Maori Land Court, Judge Armstrong said a high level of trust is required from marae trustees.  They hold land, cash and other marae assets in trust for members.

Whilst Mr Witehira was not convicted of dishonesty, he attempted to mislead the court by wrongly stating that he had never misappropriated client money, Judge Armstrong said.

Mr Witehira lacks the honesty and integrity to act as a marae trustee, Judge Armstrong said.

re Mataraua B 5B1A – Maori Land Court (21.11.25)

26.016

Executor: Wilson v. Albert

  

Appointed as executor of his late mother’s estate, William Albert did a good job of calling in available liquid assets and distributing proceeds to beneficiaries, but acted as if their Wairoa family home as the remaining estate asset was his alone, refusing to pay for it.  The High Court removed him as executor, appointing the Public Trust in his place and with it power to sell the home.

His mother Mokai Kate Albert died in 2021.  Her will named as beneficiaries her biological son William together with two others adopted into the family as whangai adoptions: Jimmy and Kelly.  All three are to share equally in her estate.

The High Court was told William as executor cashed up his mother’s bank accounts and life insurance, realising some $41,000 which was split three ways between the beneficiaries.

This left their mother’s McLean Street home, occupied by William; valued in 2025 at about $299,000.

Kelly lives in Australia; Jimmy in Wairoa.

Jimmy told the High Court that indications by William that he would buy the family home have come to nothing.  There was no evidence that William is paying rent whilst living at McLean Street, or paying rates, or keeping the property insured.

On Jimmy’s application, Justice Gendall used Administration Act powers to remove William as executor, appointing the Public Trust.

William did not file any statement of defence.  He was ordered to pay all legal costs incurred removing him as executor, to be deducted from his one third share on sale of McLean Street.

Wilson v. Albert – High Court (21.11.25)

26.018

Family Trusts: Cook v. Hair

  

Part of bitter and hostile litigation following end of their twenty year relationship, Anna Cook complains two family trusts holding millions of dollars in assets set up by former partner Ian Hair are primarily supporting Mr Hair financially while leaving her in the cold.  The High Court removed all trustees, appointing an independent trustee required to take an even-handed approach to beneficiary requests.   

Both Ms Cook and Mr Hair are discretionary beneficiaries of two family trusts: the Hair Family Trust and the Murian Trust.

Ms Cook says Hair Family owns an extensive portfolio of residential properties; Murian a residential property in Takapuna she describes as being worth more than six million dollars.

The two trusts are controlled by Mr Hair and Auckland lawyer Douglas Burgess.

A bitter relationship property dispute in the Family Court spilled over into the High Court with Ms Cook complaining trust assets are being used to support Mr Hair’s litigation costs, while she is forced to live hand-to-mouth, struggling to support herself and their son.

Evidence was given of pleas to the trustees for financial support being either ignored or fobbed off with replies stating there were currently insufficient funds available.

Ms Cook claims some $500,000 from trust sources were made available to Mr Hair for payment of legal fees.

Justice Wilkinson-Smith ruled that Mr Hair had used his position as trustee to benefit himself personally and to disadvantage Ms Cook.  Mr Burgess as the current independent trustee had been unable to act with sufficient independence, given his relationship with Mr Hair, she said.

Both were removed as trustee on grounds that Mr Hair’s conflict of interest led to a lack of impartiality; replaced by Comac Trustees as sole trustee.

In addition, Ms Cook asked that terms of each Trust be amended to remove Mr Hair as ‘appointer,’ and with it his power to unilaterally name new trustees and beneficiaries.

As appointer, Mr Hair could circumvent the court order appointing Comac Trustees, she said.

Declining to change trust wording, Justice Wilkinson-Smith warned Mr Hair he would be answerable to the court if his power of appointment were used contrary to the current court ruling.

Cook v. Hair – High Court (21.11.25)

26.017

Sale: Sidey v. Ngatapa Ltd

  

There is no binding agreement until there is a binding agreement the Court of Appeal emphasised, ruling Rakaia-based Mark Cox and Sarah Dods were free to terminate a $7.75 million farm deal and sell to a higher buyer after Mick Sidey dallied too long in exercising a due diligence clause.

The court dismissed Mr Sidey’s claim that his contract had been affirmed, giving him ongoing rights as first buyer.

In July 2025, Mr Sidey signed up to buy a 198 hectare farm on Coutts Island Road in Christchurch from Ngatapa Ltd, a company controlled by Mr Cox and Ms Dods.   

A due diligence clause gave Mr Sidey fifteen working days to complete his assessment of the intended purchase.  By agreement, this due diligence period was extended, twice.

Three days after the second extension expired, the two sides were still finalising details: transfer of irrigation rights, the status of past insurance claims for earthquake damage, and permission to truck in stock for grazing prior to contract settlement date.

With these details apparently sorted out, lawyers for Ngatapa asked for email confirmation that all was agreed, before the original written contract was amended and circulated for signature.

The court was told email confirmation was provided, but Ngatapa instead terminated the deal before the initial contract was amended and signed, selling elsewhere for a better price.

Mr Sidey claimed Ngatapa’s request for an email response confirming final details amounted to an affirmation of the otherwise expired contract; his contract to buy still stood, he said.

This interchange was no more than another step in ongoing negotiations, the Court of Appeal ruled.  The prior contract was no longer held open awaiting completion of due diligence.  The extended period of due diligence had expired.  Ngatapa was free to sell elsewhere.

Sidey v. Ngatapa Ltd – Court of Appeal (20.11.25)

26.015

Family Trust: Nath v. Nath

  

What started as a prudent decision to place their South Auckland family home into trust as protection against business creditors turned into a sibling standoff with Roneel Nath treating the Alfriston property as his own; not paying rent to the trust, allowing the property to run down, and failing to account for rent paid by tenants occupying a smaller dwelling on site.

Justice Gault ordered the property be sold and the Nath Brothers Family Trust wound up. 

Roneel and brother Vicky Nath are the two trustees.  They are named, together with their mother Sunil Lata, as the Trust’s primary beneficiaries.

The High Court was told their family trust was established in 2013.  Initially, it operated as an investment trust; buying and later selling a property in Mangere East.   

In 2016, the family home on Everlea Place was transferred into the Trust.

Their mother continued living there after transfer to trust ownership, together with son Roneel and his family. 

A decade later, the relationship between brothers Roneel and Vicky had become decidedly frosty.

Claims Roneel was letting the property fall into disrepair and failing to account for rentals received were major points of friction.

Vicky said his brother refused to enter into discussions.  He refused to countenance any winding up of their Trust, Vicky said.

The High Court was told their mother supported Vicky’s plans to terminate the Trust.

With the trustees deadlocked, Justice Gault used Trusts Act powers to order a sale of Everlea Place and termination of the Trust.

Evidence was given that net equity in Everlea Place is some $2.2 million.

Justice Gault ordered payments be made from proceeds of sale to reimburse beneficiary loans made to the Trust: Vicky ($311,050); Roneel ($141,912); and their mother ($265,520).

He further ordered reimbursement of any expenses incurred by Vicky and his mother on repairs to put the property into a saleable state, up to a maximum of $95,000 as set out in a repair schedule presented to the court.

The net balance is to be divided three ways between the major beneficiaries: Sunil Lata and her two sons.

Roneel was ordered to provide a verified statement of account for rentals received from the minor dwelling on the property.  Should he fail to do so, Vicky and his mother are to each receive $105 for every week the dwelling was rented out, deducted from Roneel’s share on termination of the Trust.

Roneel did not defend his brother’s court application to wind up the Trust.

Nath v. Nath – High Court (20.11.25)

26.014

Trespass: Pipiriki Township v. Cripps

  

Maori Land Court referenced concepts of mana inherent in ownership of Maori Land, departing from English land law concepts of trespass, when ordering Jay Cripps pack up and leave his unauthorised commercial campsite, operating on the Whanganui River near Pipiriki.

The court was told Jay Cripps has been squatting on the site for over a decade.  Ownership lies with local Maori incorporation: Pipiriki Township No 1.

The legal difficulty facing Pipiriki Township, seeking to force Mr Cripps out, is that the campsite is on land currently leased for forestry on a 99 year lease to Waimarino Forests Ltd.

Pipiriki Township faced an apparently unsurmountable legal hurdle: land law rules inherited from England hinder owners of leased land seeking to trespass anyone.  A lease gives the lessee rights of possession; it is for the lessee to enforce its rights of possession by suing squatters for trespass.

Waimarino Forests told the Maori Land Court that while no permission had been given Mr Cripps to operate his commercial campsite on the leased land, it was not interested as lessee in incurring legal expenses ejecting him.  Ultimate ownership of Waimarino lies with investors in British Virgin Islands and Singapore.

In the Maori Land Court, Judge Warren pointed out that the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act imported into New Zealand statute law concepts of Maori tikanga going beyond the English law concept of land ownership simply being control over an economic asset.

For Maori, land in customary ownership is more than just an economic asset; it reflects the genealogy, the history and the mana of its current owners. 

Having Mr Cripps operate a business on leased Pipiriki land, without Maori landowners’ consent, caused spiritual and reputational damage to Pipiriki owners, Judge Warren said.

Pipiriki had no control over how Mr Cripps cared for their land or told their stories.

Departing from the general law of trespass, Judge Warren ruled Pipiriki Township could sue to trespass Mr Cripps from his campsite, despite Pipiriki having no rights of possession to the land during Waimarino Forests’ 99 year lease.

Mr Cripps was given two months to clear all structures from the site, and ordered to then leave permanently.

Pipiriki Township No. 1 Inc v. Cripps – Maori Land Court (19.11.25)

26.013

Investment: South Hyde Consulting v. SPSS Group

  

Initially it looked like a match made in heaven with Glenn Jenkin’s SPSS Group linking up with Tim Blake’s South Hyde Consulting, given their joint interest in sporting apparel and outdoor activities.  It fell apart within months.

Tim Blake promotes hunting and walking tours based out of Kaikoura.  Glenn Jenkins specialises in sports, fitness and apparel brands.

The two joined forces in a series of agreements culminating in a 2023 deal seeing Blake’s South Hyde agreeing to put up $200,000 as its share of a limited liability partnership.

The deal quickly collapsed.

At the start, South Hyde was required to front with only $175,000 cash of its promised $200,000; the balance ‘paid’ by way of Mr Blake taking a $25,000 salary sacrifice.

The District Court was told early enthusiasm turned to disillusionment.

Mr Blake was taken on at a $100,000 salary.  Mr Jenkins alleged poor profitability was caused by Mr Blake’s overspending and poor decision-making.

For Mr Jenkins, the last straw was Mr Blake’s South Hyde suing to recover its $200,000 investment.

Investment terms gave South Hyde a put option; requiring Mr Jenkin’s SPSS Group to buy it out of the partnership at $200,000 if demanded at any time within the first twelve months.

There was no dispute this put option was valid.

Mr Jenkins countered that Mr Blake’s departure from the business within six months was in breach of his employment contract; damages for poor performance and early departure should be set off against any return of the $200,000 investment.

Mr Jenkins personally argued his case.

Judge Hunt ruled Mr Jenkins had failed to recognise the investment deal was entirely separate from Mr Blake’s employment contract.

Mr Blake’s employment contract, whatever its terms, was between Mr Blake and their investment vehicle of choice: the limited liability partnership.

The put option was between different parties: investors SPSS Group and South Hyde; parties separate from the disputed employment contract.

Terms of their original investment did not set out conditions for employment of Mr Blake.

No counter claim could apply.  A counter claim requires mutuality.

SPSS was ordered to pay the $200,000 due South Hyde under its put option, regardless of any separate employment dispute between their partnership and Mr Blake.

South Hyde Consulting & Investments Ltd v. Speed Power & Stability Systems Manufacturing Ltd – District Court (18.11.25)

26.012

Fraud: Kea Investments Ltd v. Wikeley

  

Ken Wikeley failed in his attempt to avoid contempt of court charges and bankruptcy, seeking a court-brokered deal.  He is seemingly left as the fall guy in a fraudulent transaction allegedly cooked up by entrepreneur Eric Watson and apparently designed to siphon funds from Sir Owen Glenn’s Kea Investments.

Kea Investments Ltd has launched litigation in three different countries to unwind what New Zealand courts ruled was a fraudulently obtained US court order by Wikeley’s family trust after a Kentucky court ordered Kea pay USD123 million, supposedly for breach of contract.  No such debt is owed, New Zealand courts ruled.

The presence of Eric Watson lurks in the background, with allegations he engineered the fraud.

In separate litigation, in the United Kingdom, Mr Watson is strongly resisting payment of GBP129 million an England court ordered he pay Sir Owen.

Currently, Mr Wikeley has lost control of his family trust, now in the hands of interim liquidators.  He faces contempt of court charges filed in Queensland and is threatened with bankruptcy for non-payment of court-ordered costs.  His Australian passport has been impounded, preventing travel.

Desperate to extricate himself from this legal morass, Mr Wikeley asked the High Court in New Zealand to convene a judicial settlement conference to approve a possible settlement.

High Court rules allow litigants to negotiate an out of court settlement presided over by a judge.  This can short-cut both court-scheduling delays and expensive drawn-out court hearings.

Judicial settlement conferences are not common.  By the time a dispute is ready for trial, both sides are at daggers drawn; compromise is unlikely.

Justice Gault refused to order a judicial settlement conference.

Kea Investments was not interested.  It is looking to enforce current court rulings against Mr Wikeley.

The High Court was told Mr Wikeley is offering to have the fraudulent Kentucky court ruling overturned, saving Kea the expense of proving in a US court all the facts already heard by a New Zealand court; this support in return for Kea Investments abandoning all current litigation against him personally.

The fraudulent Kentucky litigation was not taken in the name of Mr Wikeley personally; it is in the name of his Wikeley Family Trust.  This Trust was not part of the proposed judicial settlement conference.  Mr Wikeley no longer controls his family trust.  It would not be bound by any promises he made to have the Kentucky court ruling overturned, Justice Gault said.

Kea Investments Ltd v. Wikeley – High Court (17.11.25)

26.009

Executor: re Estate Maria Vogelbein

  

Wolfgang Vogelbein’s dogged refusal to carry out terms of his late wife’s will resulted in removal as executor after claiming her estate should be managed following a ‘process control approach’ informed by his qualifications in chemistry and thermodynamics.

Maria Vogelbein died in 2022.  Probate of her will was granted to three executors, required to act jointly: Mr Vogelbein plus two partners in Te Awamutu law firm Edmonds Judd.

Her estate consists of bank accounts and term deposits totalling some $200,000 together with her half share in their Kihkihi home.  Their half interests are held as tenants-in-common.  Maria’s half share does not pass to her widowed spouse; it remains part of her estate.

Her will gives Wolfgang a life interest in her half share, allowing him uninterrupted possession of their Kihikihi home, with her half share passing on Wolfgang’s death to her daughter from an earlier relationship. 

The High Court was told lawyers at Edmonds Judd found it impossible to progress the estate.

Wolfgang did not sign documents necessary to change control of Maria’s bank accounts.

He claimed to own a three-quarter share of their Kihikihi home, rather than one half; the consequence of extra funds provided personally to renovate the property, he claimed.

He further claimed a 1989 pre-nuptial agreement signed in South Africa applied to their property rights.

He flatly refused to insure the Kihikihi property, stating he fundamentally disagrees with the concept of insurance.  Later accepting the will specifically required insurance cover over his late wife’s share of the property, now held in trust, he demanded that the insurance not extend to the share he owned.

His fellow executors told the High Court it is totally impracticable to insure an undivided half interest in property.

Executors from Edmonds Judd offered to withdraw as executors, provided Mr Vogelbein was removed.

Associate Judge Sussock said it was expedient that all three executors be removed.  Corporate trustee Comac Trustees Ltd was appointed in their place.

re Estate of Maria Vogelbein – High Court (17.11.25)

26.011

Undue Influence: re Estate of Johan de Rooy

  

He was a passive gentle man, according to the evidence; she a strong domineering personality.  The High Court ruled invalid because of her undue influence Johan de Rooy’s 2021 will which left his Whangarei property to former spouse Alaine Jeanette Coleman, known variously as Jeanette, Ali and Alaine.

Justice Brewer described Ms Coleman as taking active steps in the years prior to Johan’s 2021 death to isolate Johan from former friends and acquaintances, blocking access by members of his church, instigating both the dismissal of his former lawyer and cancellation of a power of attorney in favour of his brother, and then arranging for Johan to sign a new will two months before his death, leaving all to her.

Ms Coleman represented herself at trial.  Justice Brewer stated she did so with some skill, demonstrating a fierce intelligence and great determination.

One of Johan’s brothers challenged validity of the 2021 will.  He claimed Ms Coleman is controlling and manipulative.

The High Court was told Johan and Alaine married in 2006.  He was aged 54; she is the older by four years.  Johan had lived with his mother until she went into care just prior to her death.

Their marriage was punctuated by Ms Coleman obtaining a protection order against Johan in 2008, then Johan made subject to a two year supervision order in 2009 on charges he pleaded guilty to, later claiming he ‘confessed’ to offences manufactured by Ms Coleman after she threatened to leave him, followed by a short period in prison for supposed breaches of the earlier protection order, with the District Court later dismissing her claims of violence.

Johan was later discovered to have earlier suffered an undiagnosed stroke.

This stroke led him to become dependent on Ms Coleman for aspects of his daily care.  He later claimed that through her coercive behaviour she had him confess to immoral and illegal acts he had never committed.

They divorced in 2014.

Johan’s brother claimed in court that Ms Coleman later regained control of Johan’s life on learning he was terminally ill with brain cancer.

She claimed they had remained in regular contact since their 2014 divorce; that they had never really separated and that John had deceived his relatives about their ongoing relationship.

Changes to his will, leaving all to her, reflected his belated acknowledgment of their ongoing relationship, she claimed.

In the High Court, Justice Brewer stated Ms Coleman has a propensity for controlling the narrative, creating a formal record favourable to herself.

Her informal interaction in one instance with Johan’s former lawyer was followed up with an email painting the lawyer as an interfering meddler, accompanied by threats of a complaint being laid with the Law Society.

A glowing testimonial attesting to her ongoing care of Johan, drafted by Ms Coleman and signed by the vicar of their church, was coloured by the fact, unknown to the vicar, that the two were in fact divorced.

Justice Brewer commented that a short video shown at Johan’s funeral which featured him praising Ms Coleman did not have Johan looking directly at the camera; instead, Johan frequently looked off to one side, the inference being Ms Coleman was present, he said.

The 2021 will in favour of Ms Coleman was ruled invalid on grounds of undue influence. Justice Brewer granted probate to an earlier 2011 will, dividing Johan’s estate between his four siblings.

The estate’s major asset is a residential unit in Whangarei.

re Estate of Johan Frans de Rooy – High Court (13.11.25)

26.010

Ban: Business & Innovation v. Wallace

  

Ministry of Business asked for an indefinite ban on 68 year old fraudster Richard Mark Wallace ever again being involved in the car trade, given his near sixty fraud offences spanning thirty years and two jail terms.  In the District Court, a just expired five year ban was extended for a further five years, in light of his recidivist behaviour.

Employment in the car trade requires licensing under the Motor Vehicle Sales Act; participants need to satisfy a ‘fit and proper’ test.

Wallace has an extensive record of fraud and dishonesty, most recently using multiple aliases selling ‘ghost cars’ through online platforms such as TradeMe.  He is currently required to pay fifty dollars per fortnight in reparations across multiple victims.

Wallace told the District Court he is unable to get regular employment because of his criminal history.  He said a Mr David Duke, who manages a business named as NB Cars, was willing to take him on as an independent contractor, providing intensive supervision.

Greater income will enable an increase in reparations to $250 per fortnight, he said.

Reparations remaining unpaid currently total some $80,000.

There is no detail around the level of supervision and how supervision would be carried out, Judge Clark said.

There is nothing in this proposal which gives absolute confidence that past behaviour would not occur again, he said.

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v. Wallace – District Court (12.11.25)

26.008

Corporate Governance: Jenner v. Corrections Association

  

Within one month of Glen Jenner’s election as vice-president of the prison officers’ union, his stated intention to shake-up current union policy resulted in attempts by the old guard led by union president Floyd du Plessis to remove him from office in a manner the Employment Court ruled was in breach of natural justice and was illegal.

Old butted heads with new, in what amounted to a major upheaval following Corrections Union elections in 2025.

Already a member of the union’s 24 member executive committee, Mr Jenner was elected vice-president at the union’s 2025 elections on a platform promoting a need for change in current direction, spending, bargaining approaches and priorities.

He works at Rimutaka Prison, near Wellington.

At time of this election, Mr Jenner was already under threat of disciplinary proceedings.

In general, it is alleged Mr Jenner has undermined union executives and was disruptive at executive committee meetings.

Following Mr Jenner’s election as vice-president, Mr Du Plessis refused to deal with him in person, unless a witness was present.  Mr du Plessis supported a union executive resolution having the effect of allowing Mr Jenner to act only on directions from himself as president.

Those holding office as vice-president are an active member of the executive, Judge Beck ruled.  Their role is not to simply act as a delegate for the president.

Steps were also taken to have Mr Jenner removed from office as vice-president on grounds of ‘just cause.’

In the Employment Court, Judge Beck ruled that the fact of Mr Jenner taking legal action against his own union, challenging its disciplinary procedures, could not amount to ‘just cause.’

The union also failed to comply with rules of natural justice, she ruled.

Disciplinary complaints against Mr Jenner were not sufficiently itemised.

In addition, there was a risk of bias in any decision by the executive committee for his removal from office as vice president, Judge Beck said.

Judicial impartiality is not expected, but those considering his removal must come to the question with an open mind and be amenable to persuasion after hearing the evidence, she said.

Members of executive committee who proposed the resolution for Mr Jenner’s removal have already signalled their decision.  They should not participate in the vote, Judge Beck ruled.

With an Employment Court ruling now clarifying the ground rules, both the current disciplinary action against Mr Jenner and his potential removal as vice president have yet to be decided.

Jenner v. Corrections Association of New Zealand Inc – Employment Court (7.11.25)

26.007

Disclosure: Liao v. Liao

 

A High Court order that daughter Pei-Ya Liao surrender ownership of an Auckland house to her parents was only the start.  Entitled to compensation for costs of construction, Pei-Ya said contract terms for the fixed price build is sufficient evidence.  Her parents want evidence of actual costs.  With the build carried out by a company part-owned by Pei-Ya’s husband, her parents are suspicious that side-deals saw the build completed for much less than the contract price, reducing compensation payable.

Their compensation dispute followed litigation commenced back in 2021, resulting in a High Court ruling that a property on White’s Way in Ellerslie was held in trust by Pei-Ya for her parents.

They had provided cash to buy a bare section, with title taken in Pei-Ya’s name to circumvent rules prohibiting foreign nationals from owning residential land.  D&T Homes Ltd, a company controlled by her husband, built a house on the site, paid for by Pei-Ya and her spouse.

Ownership was disputed.  Pei-Ya claimed the land was gifted to her; part of a family arrangement, she says.  At the time, she owned at least two other investment properties.

The High Court ruled there was no gift; Pei-Ya held the Ellerslie property in trust for her parents.  While having to surrender the property, she was entitled to compensation for the cost of building a house on the bare section, the court ruled.

Her parents demanded proof of actual costs.

Builder D&T Homes refused to release any detail.

Pei-Ya’s husband said their Ellerslie build took place during the covid-19 pandemic.  Building materials were in short supply.  D&T Homes scavenged stock from multiple sources, which was stored in bulk, and then used across several building sites with no detailed records kept allocating supply costs across various jobs.

Justice van Bohemen ordered D&T Homes disclose all relevant accounting information necessary to determine ‘actual costs’ of the Ellerslie build.

The fact D&T Homes as builder is closely linked to Pei-Ya makes made full disclosure necessary.  He cautioned against D&T Homes making unnecessary redactions to invoices, obscuring suppliers’ details.

Information provided is to be kept confidential, Justice Bohemen said.

D&T Homes alleges that if this information is made widely available, Pei-Ya’s brother would improperly use this information in operating his rival construction business.

Liao v. Liao – High Court (7.11.25)

26.006