17 November 2025

Fraud: Kea Investments Ltd v. Wikeley

  

Ken Wikeley failed in his attempt to avoid contempt of court charges and bankruptcy, seeking a court-brokered deal.  He is seemingly left as the fall guy in a fraudulent transaction allegedly cooked up by entrepreneur Eric Watson and apparently designed to siphon funds from Sir Owen Glenn’s Kea Investments.

Kea Investments Ltd has launched litigation in three different countries to unwind what New Zealand courts ruled was a fraudulently obtained US court order by Wikeley’s family trust after a Kentucky court ordered Kea pay USD123 million, supposedly for breach of contract.  No such debt is owed, New Zealand courts ruled.

The presence of Eric Watson lurks in the background, with allegations he engineered the fraud.

In separate litigation, in the United Kingdom, Mr Watson is strongly resisting payment of GBP129 million an England court ordered he pay Sir Owen.

Currently, Mr Wikeley has lost control of his family trust, now in the hands of interim liquidators.  He faces contempt of court charges filed in Queensland and is threatened with bankruptcy for non-payment of court-ordered costs.  His Australian passport has been impounded, preventing travel.

Desperate to extricate himself from this legal morass, Mr Wikeley asked the High Court in New Zealand to convene a judicial settlement conference to approve a possible settlement.

High Court rules allow litigants to negotiate an out of court settlement presided over by a judge.  This can short-cut both court-scheduling delays and expensive drawn-out court hearings.

Judicial settlement conferences are not common.  By the time a dispute is ready for trial, both sides are at daggers drawn; compromise is unlikely.

Justice Gault refused to order a judicial settlement conference.

Kea Investments was not interested.  It is looking to enforce current court rulings against Mr Wikeley.

The High Court was told Mr Wikeley is offering to have the fraudulent Kentucky court ruling overturned, saving Kea the expense of proving in a US court all the facts already heard by a New Zealand court; this support in return for Kea Investments abandoning all current litigation against him personally.

The fraudulent Kentucky litigation was not taken in the name of Mr Wikeley personally; it is in the name of his Wikeley Family Trust.  This Trust was not part of the proposed judicial settlement conference.  Mr Wikeley no longer controls his family trust.  It would not be bound by any promises he made to have the Kentucky court ruling overturned, Justice Gault said.

Kea Investments Ltd v. Wikeley – High Court (17.11.25)

26.009

13 November 2025

Undue Influence: re Estate of Johan de Rooy

  

He was a passive gentle man, according to the evidence; she a strong domineering personality.  The High Court ruled invalid because of her undue influence Johan de Rooy’s 2021 will which left his Whangarei property to former spouse Alaine Jeanette Coleman, known variously as Jeanette, Ali and Alaine.

Justice Brewer described Ms Coleman as taking active steps in the years prior to Johan’s 2021 death to isolate Johan from former friends and acquaintances, blocking access by members of his church, instigating both the dismissal of his former lawyer and cancellation of a power of attorney in favour of his brother, and then arranging for Johan to sign a new will two months before his death, leaving all to her.

Ms Coleman represented herself at trial.  Justice Brewer stated she did so with some skill, demonstrating a fierce intelligence and great determination.

One of Johan’s brothers challenged validity of the 2021 will.  He claimed Ms Coleman is controlling and manipulative.

The High Court was told Johan and Alaine married in 2006.  He was aged 54; she is the older by four years.  Johan had lived with his mother until she went into care just prior to her death.

Their marriage was punctuated by Ms Coleman obtaining a protection order against Johan in 2008, then Johan made subject to a two year supervision order in 2009 on charges he pleaded guilty to, later claiming he ‘confessed’ to offences manufactured by Ms Coleman after she threatened to leave him, followed by a short period in prison for supposed breaches of the earlier protection order, with the District Court later dismissing her claims of violence.

Johan was later discovered to have earlier suffered an undiagnosed stroke.

This stroke led him to become dependent on Ms Coleman for aspects of his daily care.  He later claimed that through her coercive behaviour she had him confess to immoral and illegal acts he had never committed.

They divorced in 2014.

Johan’s brother claimed in court that Ms Coleman later regained control of Johan’s life on learning he was terminally ill with brain cancer.

She claimed they had remained in regular contact since their 2014 divorce; that they had never really separated and that John had deceived his relatives about their ongoing relationship.

Changes to his will, leaving all to her, reflected his belated acknowledgment of their ongoing relationship, she claimed.

In the High Court, Justice Brewer stated Ms Coleman has a propensity for controlling the narrative, creating a formal record favourable to herself.

Her informal interaction in one instance with Johan’s former lawyer was followed up with an email painting the lawyer as an interfering meddler, accompanied by threats of a complaint being laid with the Law Society.

A glowing testimonial attesting to her ongoing care of Johan, drafted by Ms Coleman and signed by the vicar of their church, was coloured by the fact, unknown to the vicar, that the two were in fact divorced.

Justice Brewer commented that a short video shown at Johan’s funeral which featured him praising Ms Coleman did not have Johan looking directly at the camera; instead, Johan frequently looked off to one side, the inference being Ms Coleman was present, he said.

The 2021 will in favour of Ms Coleman was ruled invalid on grounds of undue influence. Justice Brewer granted probate to an earlier 2011 will, dividing Johan’s estate between his four siblings.

The estate’s major asset is a residential unit in Whangarei.

re Estate of Johan Frans de Rooy – High Court (13.11.25)

26.010

12 November 2025

Ban: Business & Innovation v. Wallace

  

Ministry of Business asked for an indefinite ban on 68 year old fraudster Richard Mark Wallace ever again being involved in the car trade, given his near sixty fraud offences spanning thirty years and two jail terms.  In the District Court, a just expired five year ban was extended for a further five years, in light of his recidivist behaviour.

Employment in the car trade requires licensing under the Motor Vehicle Sales Act; participants need to satisfy a ‘fit and proper’ test.

Wallace has an extensive record of fraud and dishonesty, most recently using multiple aliases selling ‘ghost cars’ through online platforms such as TradeMe.  He is currently required to pay fifty dollars per fortnight in reparations across multiple victims.

Wallace told the District Court he is unable to get regular employment because of his criminal history.  He said a Mr David Duke, who manages a business named as NB Cars, was willing to take him on as an independent contractor, providing intensive supervision.

Greater income will enable an increase in reparations to $250 per fortnight, he said.

Reparations remaining unpaid currently total some $80,000.

There is no detail around the level of supervision and how supervision would be carried out, Judge Clark said.

There is nothing in this proposal which gives absolute confidence that past behaviour would not occur again, he said.

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v. Wallace – District Court (12.11.25)

26.008

07 November 2025

Corporate Governance: Jenner v. Corrections Association

  

Within one month of Glen Jenner’s election as vice-president of the prison officers’ union, his stated intention to shake-up current union policy resulted in attempts by the old guard led by union president Floyd du Plessis to remove him from office in a manner the Employment Court ruled was in breach of natural justice and was illegal.

Old butted heads with new, in what amounted to a major upheaval following Corrections Union elections in 2025.

Already a member of the union’s 24 member executive committee, Mr Jenner was elected vice-president at the union’s 2025 elections on a platform promoting a need for change in current direction, spending, bargaining approaches and priorities.

He works at Rimutaka Prison, near Wellington.

At time of this election, Mr Jenner was already under threat of disciplinary proceedings.

In general, it is alleged Mr Jenner has undermined union executives and was disruptive at executive committee meetings.

Following Mr Jenner’s election as vice-president, Mr Du Plessis refused to deal with him in person, unless a witness was present.  Mr du Plessis supported a union executive resolution having the effect of allowing Mr Jenner to act only on directions from himself as president.

Those holding office as vice-president are an active member of the executive, Judge Beck ruled.  Their role is not to simply act as a delegate for the president.

Steps were also taken to have Mr Jenner removed from office as vice-president on grounds of ‘just cause.’

In the Employment Court, Judge Beck ruled that the fact of Mr Jenner taking legal action against his own union, challenging its disciplinary procedures, could not amount to ‘just cause.’

The union also failed to comply with rules of natural justice, she ruled.

Disciplinary complaints against Mr Jenner were not sufficiently itemised.

In addition, there was a risk of bias in any decision by the executive committee for his removal from office as vice president, Judge Beck said.

Judicial impartiality is not expected, but those considering his removal must come to the question with an open mind and be amenable to persuasion after hearing the evidence, she said.

Members of executive committee who proposed the resolution for Mr Jenner’s removal have already signalled their decision.  They should not participate in the vote, Judge Beck ruled.

With an Employment Court ruling now clarifying the ground rules, both the current disciplinary action against Mr Jenner and his potential removal as vice president have yet to be decided.

Jenner v. Corrections Association of New Zealand Inc – Employment Court (7.11.25)

26.007

Disclosure: Liao v. Liao

 

A High Court order that daughter Pei-Ya Liao surrender ownership of an Auckland house to her parents was only the start.  Entitled to compensation for costs of construction, Pei-Ya said contract terms for the fixed price build is sufficient evidence.  Her parents want evidence of actual costs.  With the build carried out by a company part-owned by Pei-Ya’s husband, her parents are suspicious that side-deals saw the build completed for much less than the contract price, reducing compensation payable.

Their compensation dispute followed litigation commenced back in 2021, resulting in a High Court ruling that a property on White’s Way in Ellerslie was held in trust by Pei-Ya for her parents.

They had provided cash to buy a bare section, with title taken in Pei-Ya’s name to circumvent rules prohibiting foreign nationals from owning residential land.  D&T Homes Ltd, a company controlled by her husband, built a house on the site, paid for by Pei-Ya and her spouse.

Ownership was disputed.  Pei-Ya claimed the land was gifted to her; part of a family arrangement, she says.  At the time, she owned at least two other investment properties.

The High Court ruled there was no gift; Pei-Ya held the Ellerslie property in trust for her parents.  While having to surrender the property, she was entitled to compensation for the cost of building a house on the bare section, the court ruled.

Her parents demanded proof of actual costs.

Builder D&T Homes refused to release any detail.

Pei-Ya’s husband said their Ellerslie build took place during the covid-19 pandemic.  Building materials were in short supply.  D&T Homes scavenged stock from multiple sources, which was stored in bulk, and then used across several building sites with no detailed records kept allocating supply costs across various jobs.

Justice van Bohemen ordered D&T Homes disclose all relevant accounting information necessary to determine ‘actual costs’ of the Ellerslie build.

The fact D&T Homes as builder is closely linked to Pei-Ya makes made full disclosure necessary.  He cautioned against D&T Homes making unnecessary redactions to invoices, obscuring suppliers’ details.

Information provided is to be kept confidential, Justice Bohemen said.

D&T Homes alleges that if this information is made widely available, Pei-Ya’s brother would improperly use this information in operating his rival construction business.

Liao v. Liao – High Court (7.11.25)

26.006

06 November 2025

Deadlock: Nahkle v. Karaka Estate

 

With transactions in excess of seventeen million dollars in dispute, the High Court ruled companies owned by the Auckland Nahkle family can face liquidation because of a management deadlock, overriding in-house rules requiring family disputes first go to arbitration.  Matriarch Henriette Nahkle alleges son Daniel has misappropriated family money; he claims a 2015 family agreement gave him control over company business assets. 

Family riches came from property development, later reinvested in land around Kingseat in South Auckland held in the names of Karaka Estate Ltd and Byerley Park Ltd.  Mother and son are directors.

Byerley Park currently runs a horse breeding and training facility; trading at a loss, the High Court was told.

Henriette alleges Daniel has failed to properly account for his use of family funds.  In turn, Daniel says all disagreements were resolved back in 2015, with an agreement giving him ownership of family assets.

The breadth and effect of this 2015 agreement is disputed.

Subsequently, Henriette blocked transfer of any further family funds to Daniel.

A 2024 mediation failed to resolve family differences.

When Henriette took Companies Act steps to wind up both Karaka Estate and Byerley Park on ‘just and equitable’ grounds, Daniel claimed this was premature; family trust deeds require their ongoing dispute first to go to arbitration, he said.

Associate Judge Brittain ruled an arbitration clause might see the High Court defer a liquidation hearing, but such a clause cannot override Companies Act rights to seek liquidation.   

It is not clear how any issues suitable for arbitration could be defined in this case, he said.  Management is deadlocked, with an irretrievable breakdown of trust between mother and son as directors.

He ruled their dispute be set down for a Companies Act hearing, to determine whether liquidation of the two companies is needed to resolve the deadlock.

Nahkle v. Karaka Estate Ltd – High Court (6.11.25)

26.005

Asset Forfeiture: Commissioner of Police v. Allen

 

Pleading guilty to charges of cannabis supply, William James Allen then faced a proceeds of crime application seeking to sell a suite of six properties he owns in Wellington, Napier and Hastings all mortgaged to ANZ Bank.  In a structured sell-down akin to corporate restructuring, the High Court approved a self-managed asset realisation with Allen agreeing to hand over $1.3 million as proceeds of crime. 

Whilst admitting to dealing in cannabis, Allen disputes that his property purchases were funded in any way by proceeds of crime.  Nevertheless, he agreed to a court-approved Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act settlement in which he will self-manage sale of as many properties as may be needed to generate $1.3 million payable as proceeds of crime.

It was earlier agreed that $1.08 million was generated from illegal cannabis sales.  The amount payable to settle the proceeds of crime claim was increased to $1.3 million, to cover the contingency that Allen may not sell properties as promised, forcing further action by police to recover payment.

Terms of the High Court order give Allen time to make full payment: August 2026.

All six properties are currently subject to restraining orders.

Allen’s lawyer was empowered to liaise with Insolvency Service to have restraining orders lifted sequentially on properties as they are sold.  His lawyer was further empowered to liaise with Insolvency Service to temporarily lift restraining orders over properties not being sold but requiring refinancing to accommodate ANZ Bank’s lending criteria.

Net proceeds of each sale are to be handed over in reduction of the court approved settlement.

Justice Churchman ruled that any properties remaining after full payment of $1.3 million are removed from restraint and return to Allen’s full control.

The restrained properties are: (in Wellington) at Wainuiomata and Lower Hutt; (in Napier) at Maraenui; (and in Hastings) at Flaxmere.

Commissioner of Police v. Allen – High Court (6.11.25)

26.004

03 November 2025

Family Trust: Darlow v. Pilbrow

 

Holding up distribution of a $2.5 million family trust, Anne Pilbrow was warned failure to promptly file her claim in court alleging wrongdoing by an Auckland lawyer as trustee meant she would get trust legal costs to date charged against her share, resulting in some $22,000 deducted from her final payout.

Final distribution of the Pilbrow Property Trust was delayed first by a dispute over Owen Pilbrow’s will, and second by Anne Pilbrow’s demand to be compensated for what she claims are currency exchange losses.  She lives in Australia.

Mr Pilbrow died in 2020, survived by nine children.

Another daughter, Vicky, challenged potential distributions from both his will and the trust.  She was unsuccessful in a 2024 Family Court hearing on her Family Protection Act claim against her late father’s estate; her plans to sue the trust were settled out of court in 2022.

The way was now open to wind up both Mr Pilbrow’s estate and his Pilbrow Property Trust.  His nine children are equal beneficiaries of both the estate and the trust. 

The High Court was told daughter Anne mounted a letter-writing campaign against Pilbrow trustee, Auckland lawyer Chris Darlow, complaining that exchange rate movements in the intervening years had cost her in excess of AUD 64,000.  This was later extended to allegations by her that Mr Darlow concealed financial information and manipulated trust finances.

All these allegations are denied.

She sent letters of complaint to the High Court and threatened to write to the Law Society and the Ombudsman.

Mr Darlow said distribution of $2.5 million trust assets could not be finalised until this dispute was sorted out.

In the interim, Mr Darlow paid out her eight siblings their $277,000 share, paying Anne a reduced sum of $200,000 while holding back the balance as security towards his costs as trustee.  The Pilbrow trust deed gives trustees a right of payment out of trust assets for expenses incurred as trustee.

A Trusts Act notice was served on Anne in Australia giving her 90 days to make progress, filing in court her claim against the trustee seeking damages.  She failed to do so.

The High Court subsequently ruled she was barred from later filing any claim.

A Trusts Act 90 day notice is designed to cut through any impasse, forcing claimants to start legal action or lose the right to sue.

The court order also stated the trustee’s ongoing legal fees of $22,000 are to be deducted from the balance of $77,000 still to be distributed to Anne as her share of the Pilbrow Trust.

Darlow v. Pilbrow – High Court (3.11.25)

26.003

31 October 2025

Loan: Gemmell v. Gemmell

 

When Libby Reilly’s nine year relationship with Rewi Gemmell came to an end, it was a complete surprise to be told nearly thirty per cent of their Coromandel home was owned by Rewi’s father.  The High Court later ruled Arthur Gemmell’s financial contributions to their home were interest-free loans and could not be construed by Maori custom as giving him ownership rights.

The High Court heard evidence of Arthur Gemmell seeking to be scrupulously fair as between his children, ensuring they shared equally in getting financial support; a practice which undermined later claims he was part-owner of Libby’s and Rewi’s family home.  

While working as a builder at Hahei on Coromandel peninsular in 2009, Rewi purchased land funded with a bank mortgage and $80,000 put in by his father, Arthur.  A year later, Arthur provided another $20,000 to help fund purchase of a relocatable house shifted to the site, used by Rewi and Libby as their family home.

With their relationship at an end, Rewi claimed his father had a 28 per cent equity interest in the property.  This reduced the value of Libby’s relationship property claim over the family home.

Father and son claimed there was an oral ‘ownership agreement’ between them, having Arthur’s cash contributions creating an ownership interest.  This flowed from Maori tikanga, they said; Maori custom for some hapu recognises that a father’s financial support for a son to buy property sees the father part-owning that property.  For Maori, multi-party ownership is the norm within ancestral landholdings.

In court, the paperwork did not match this supposed family understanding.

The $20,000 payment in 2010 was matched against a bank deposit reference as being a ‘loan…interest free.’  Subsequent $20,000 payments by Arthur to his son, used to help paydown his bank mortgage, were similarly described as loans, with interest payable at 2.5 per cent.

The court was told Rewi did pay interest for a period, then stopped.

There was no documentation for the initial $80,000 advance.

Arthur subsequently signed a new will which stated this $80,000 contribution was an interest free loan to Rewi, and that on Arthur’s death this benefit was to be taken into account when distributing his estate between his two children.

Evidence was given of an excel spreadsheet named ‘house equity.xlsx’ set up by Rewi in 2010 detailing house ownership in proportion to cash put in by Arthur, Rewi and another relative, since repaid.  Forensic evidence indicated this spreadsheet was in fact created in 2010.

Justice Anderson ruled Rewi was aware from the outset that the $80,000 contribution from his father was a loan.  No trust arrangement existed such that Rewi held part-ownership on behalf of his father.

Tikanga may have influenced how Rewi viewed family interests over the property, Justice Anderson said, but the written evidence was that of a loan by Rewi’s father, with Rewi as the sole owner.

The $100,000 contributed by Arthur as interest-free on-demand loans is now repayable given that Arthur has made demand for payment, she ruled.

This debt arose out of purchase of a family home.  It is a relationship debt, repayable before any split of relationship property.

Gemmell v. Gemmell – High Court (31.10.25)

25.229

30 October 2025

Trade Mark: APEDA v. Patent Office

 

Following disputes over use of the name ‘champagne’ and then ‘manuka honey,’ now it is the turn of basmati rice with India seeking to have sales of Pakistan’s basmati rice blocked in New Zealand.

New Zealand imports over one thousand tonnes of basmati rice each year, primarily from India and Pakistan. 

Back in 2019, India’s Ministry of Commerce made Trade Marks Act application to register a certification trade mark for basmati rice.  If approved, only basmati rice produced in India could be sold in New Zealand.

India’s Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) said registration of ‘basmati’ in New Zealand is needed to identify its product as having recognised quality standards.

Consumers see Trade Marks Act certification marks every day, having little understanding of their origin: the “Made in New Zealand’ symbol; the ‘Woolmark’ symbol; the Heart Foundation’s ‘tick’ symbol.

This certification has economic value, making promises as to a product’s source and/or quality.

Owner of a certification mark can block suppliers using the mark in New Zealand without permission.

A legal campaign by French winegrowers now sees use of the word ‘champagne’ in respect of wine applying only to product produced in a specific region of France using specific grape varieties, excluding competitors in New Zealand from using the same name.

New Zealand honey producers were not so successful in attempts to claim monopoly rights to manuka honey products.  The name ‘manuka honey’ is descriptive, but not distinctive to New Zealand alone.  The same product is produced in Australia from its own native flora.

India’s APEDA application claiming a certification mark for its basmati rice was unsuccessful; it faced the same legal issue as manuka honey.

Basmati rice is a type of rice, not distinctive to India alone.

APEDA appealed Trade Mark office refusal of certification.

In the High Court, Justice Boldt offered APEDA the opportunity to amend its application to allow basmati rice from Pakistan to also use the basmati name in New Zealand.

APEDA indicated that it might allow ‘legitimate’ Pakistan suppliers to use the name to describe its product when sold in New Zealand.

This concession was insufficient, Justice Boldt ruled.

APEDA’s application was dismissed.

Across the Tasman, the Australian Trade Mark office has refused APEDA’s similar application for basmati trade mark certification.

Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority v. Commissioner of Trade Marks – High Court (30.10.25)

25.225

Contract Hire: Ester Electrical v. Lynx Recruitment

 

Belatedly reading the fine print in Lynx Recruitment’s six page terms and conditions, Auckland company Ester Electrical subsequently learnt it could not refuse to pay when complaining staff provided by Lynx were incompetent, stuffing up a Parnell apartment build requiring remediation work costing some $290,000.

Lynx provides skilled staff as requested by clients for short-term work.  Lynx terms and conditions specifically exclude liability for any damage caused by on-hire staff and require invoices be paid without set-off within seven days.  Payment on time, with arguments sorted later, is the tenor of Lynx’ contract.

Lynx took steps to put Ester Electrical into liquidation for unpaid invoices totalling $130,000.

Ester refused to pay, claiming some of the electricians supplied by Lynx Recruitment were incompetent.  Their work had to be redone.

In the High Court, Associate Judge Lester said it is common practice in commercial contracts to prohibit set-offs, forcing clients to pay immediately even when there is an ongoing dispute, still unresolved.

Lynx Recruitment is within its rights to impose robust ‘no set-off’ rules, he said.  The fact Ester Electrical signed these terms and conditions without reading is of no relevance.

Judge Lester ordered Ester Electrical pay the outstanding $130,000 invoice within three weeks, or face liquidation.

He dismissed Ester’s claims that false CVs supplied by staff meant Lynx made false and misleading statements about the competence of staff provided, in breach of both the Consumer Guarantees Act and the Fair Trading Act.  Neither of these statutes apply to services provided for businesses by Lynx when sourcing skilled staff, Judge Lester said.

Lynx terms and conditions specifically exclude liability for what an individual may have incorrectly claimed on their CV.

Ester Electrical Ltd v. Lynx Recruitment Ltd – High Court (30.10.25)

26.002

Destiny Church: Haus of Flash v. Tamaki

 

With Destiny Church accused of an orchestrated campaign to drive them out of business, the Church failed to have legal action against it by drag performers CoCo Flash and Erika Flash put on hold until they put up security for costs.  CoCo and Erika were entitled to their day in court, Associate Judge Lester ruled.  Lack of funds to provide security for costs was primarily due to Destiny Church’s overt media campaign shutting down their ‘Rainbow Storytime’ and ‘Living Library’ activities.  

It is a regular legal tactic to seek a court order prior to any hearing forcing plaintiffs to make payments into court as security to cover defendants’ legal costs, should the plaintiffs’ claim later fail.  This can squeeze out small fry plaintiffs, causing them to abandon their claim without ever getting into court.

Sunita Torrance who performs under the stage name CoCo Flash owns New Plymouth-based Haus of Flash Ltd.

The High Court was told Haus of Flash was forced to abandon public readings through March 2024 in Rotorua, Gisborne and Hastings after what it alleges was an orchestrated Facebook campaign by members of the Destiny Church to block performances by CoCo and Erika.

Haus of Flash is claiming just under $550,000 damages alleging conspiracy by Destiny Church.

As a first step, named members of Destiny Church, including Brian Tamaki, were ordered to hand over copies of all electronic communications detailing plans to block scheduled library readings.

Facebook pages maintained by Destiny Church members variously criticised CoCo and Erika as grooming children, facilitating perversion and child abuse, and seducing vulnerable youth.

The two complained that the only supposedly relevant documents disclosed by Destiny were the New King James Bible plus one email.

Judge Lester ruled that was insufficient.

Destiny was ordered to make full disclosure of all relevant electronic communications between named Destiny members.

Failure to comply can potentially lead to subsequent court orders for the case to proceed with Destiny not permitted to appear in its defence.

Separately, CoCo and Erika, are suing for defamation under their given names of Sunita Torrance and Daniel Lockett.

Judge Lester dismissed Destiny Church’s application that they front up with security for costs.

Their impecuniosity is due to actions of Destiny Church, he said.

The court was told Mr Torrance has moved overseas.

Haus of Flash Ltd v. Tamaki – High Court (30.10.25)

26.001

 

Post judgment note: By accident or design, Destiny Church member named as sixth defendant, Hohepa Haeta, failed to file a statement of defence.  Following a formal proof hearing, he was ordered in November 2025 to pay $40,000 damages for defamation.

Patent: Oligoscience Biotech v. Commissioner of Patents

 

A patent application by German biotech company Oligoscience for a claimed novel way to optimise yield of human milk sugars failed; its supposedly new discovery identified no more than what a skilled person could adduce from existing common scientific knowledge.  A new inventive step is required to justify any patent award creating monopoly rights.

Oligoscience Biotechnology GMBH claimed novelty for its process of genetically modifying bacteria to optimise commercial yield of human milk oligosaccharides.  These HMOs are marketed as a prebiotic, feeding gut bacteria.

Commercial production of HMOs involves collection and purification of HMOs excreted from the cell wall of E.coli bacterium.  Output is optimised by then ripping the bacteria apart, extracting remaining HMO from the debris.

Oligoscience’s claimed new invention was to genetically modify E.coli bacteria, causing it to self-destruct; a so-called ‘magnesium timebomb.’

Patent Office staff rejected its application for a patent.

Oligoscience appealed.

In the High Court, Justice Churchman ruled Oliogoscience’s ‘new’ process was not novel.

The court heard argument about what was the state of scientific knowledge as at date of Oliogoscience’s 2020 patent application.

‘Common general knowledge’ is assessed as that of a scientist in a particular field having appropriate qualifications and training.

Published scientific research does not become common general knowledge until it is generally known and accepted without question by a majority of those working in that field.

Justice Churchman ruled scientific papers published up to six years prior to Oliogoscience’s patent application opened up the possibility of genetically modifying E.coli to self-destruct under certain conditions.

Oliogoscience’s use of this method to increase production of HMOs was not a novel inventive step.

Oligoscience Biotechnology GMBH v. Commissioner of Patents – High Court (30.10.25)

25.227

Repo Contract: PHC Teasury v. Settlers Honey

 

For Whanganui honey producer Henry Mathews, it was intended as a short-term three million dollar loan to ease liquidity.  Against expectations, honey prices fell, leaving his company Settlers Honey exposed and Mr Mathews unsuccessfully arguing an 87 per cent financing rate was oppressive.

The High Court was told of a 2022 repo agreement with Cliff Cook’s PHC Treasury Ltd purchasing honey stocks from Settlers for three million dollars.  Settlers kept possession of the honey.  Initial agreement was that Settlers would repurchase the honey thirteen months later for five million dollars; an effective interest rate of some 66 per cent.

With a fall in market value for honey, this arrangement went through four subsequent variations, resulting in Settlers eventually committed to an eighteen month deal having an effective interest rate of 87 per cent together with addition of second mortgage security over land owned by a related company.

When push came to shove, Settlers could not pay.  Mr Mathews stands as guarantor.

Mr Mathews and Settlers claimed the repurchase deal was an ‘oppressive credit contract,’ in breach of the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act.

PHC Treasury claimed the contract was not a loan, but an investment purchase of honey.

In economic terms, repo agreements are not ‘investments,’ they are collaterised loan contracts, with assets provided as security against repayment of a loan on due date.

The fact PHC Treasury registered its security interest over the honey on the Personal Property Securities Register underscored this point; in substance, a repo agreement is a loan, not an agreement for purchase and resale.

Treating the repo agreement as a loan, Associate Judge Skelton ruled there was no evidence that loan terms were ‘oppressive’ in breach of the Credit Contracts Act.  Oppression requires proof terms ‘contravene reasonable standards of commercial practice.’

It was Mr Mathews who offered from the outset to pay 66 per cent interest.  Later increases in the effective interest rate amounted to penalty interest for late payment.

Mr Mathews had independent legal advice both during initial negotiations and during subsequent re-negotiations, the court was told.

He provided no evidence of what amounts to common commercial practice in repo agreements.  It is not for the court to assume what is, or is not, reasonable, Judge Skelton said.  Evidence of current commercial practice is required.

Both Settlers Honey as borrower and Mr Mathews as guarantor were held liable to repay the full amount.  Further evidence is required to calculate the amount due.

PHC Treasury Ltd v. Settlers Honey Ltd & Mathews – High Court (30.10.25)

25.228

29 October 2025

Business Dispute: Thachankary v. Rasela

 

Stopping salary payments as leverage in heated negotiations between two South Auckland doctors plus allegations of false loan documentation came to a head with the High Court ordering Dr Vandana Rasela and her husband Anurag pay nearly $900,000 compensation to Dr Shigy Thachankary following a dispute over shared operation of two separate medical practices.

The High Court ruled a lease, a loan, and supposed security for this loan, used by the Raselas to oust Dr Thachankary from a Flat Bush medical centre were of no effect and invalid, with the Raselas in breach of fiduciary duties owed Dr Thachankary. 

Their business relationship started initially with a joint medical practice in Papakura.

Later, a second practice was established in nearby suburb Flat Bush.  Funding and operation of Flat Bush led later to a complete meltdown in their business relationship.

Critically, different legal structures were used for the two separate medical practices.

Papakura, operated through Auckland City Medical Clinics Ltd, is owned 50/50 by Dr Thachankary and Dr Rasela.

Flat Bush, operated as Flat Bush Medical Centre Ltd, is owned 50/50 by Dr Rasela and her husband.  Dr Thachankary provided cash upfront to set up Flat Bush, but was not listed as a shareholder.

With Dr Thackankary later complaining he was not receiving his share of fee income from Flat Bush or a return on his cash contribution, the Raselas stalled, withholding salary payments he was owed as leverage, to force resolution of their dispute.

The High Court heard evidence of the Raselas, at a time they were supposedly negotiating with Dr Thachankary, suddenly producing documentation stating they were secured creditors of Flat Bush enabling them to appoint a receiver over Flat Bush assets.

Justice Harvey stated that while there was no direct evidence that this documentation was fabricated to foil Dr Thackankary, the fact these documents surfaced very late in their dispute did raise suspicions.

Assets of the Flat Bush practice have since been sold to a third party for $481,000, the court was told.

The Raselas were ordered to pay $892,000 damages to Dr Thachankary for failing to properly reward him for his participation in Flat Bush operations, including: $257,000 for his equitable interest in Flat Bush; $400,000 for remuneration withheld; and, $235,000 plus interest in repayment of his Flat Bush loan.

In addition, the Raselas were ordered to pay $10,000 exemplary damages; special damages ordered to mark what Justice Harvey called the Raselas’ serious and outrageous misconduct.

Separately, Justice Havey was asked to rule on ownership of the Papakura medical centre owned 50/50 by Dr Thachankary and Dr Rasela through their shareholdings in Auckland City Medical Clinics Ltd.

Purchased by the two in 2016, Auckland City Medical was agreed to now be worth $1.178 million.

The court was told Dr Thachankary alone has been responsible for maintaining and growing Auckland City’s practice during their lengthy Flat Bush dispute.

Value of Auckland City Medical should be split 60:40 in Dr Thanchankray’s favour, Justice Harvey ruled.

He was given one month to buy out Dr Rasela’s forty per cent share for $471,200.

Failing that, she has a further two weeks to buy Dr Thachankary’s share.

If neither wants to assume full ownership, Auckland City Medical goes into liquidation, Justice Harvey ruled.

Thachankary v. Rasela – High Court (2.07.25 & 29.10.25)

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