31 July 2025

Joint Venture: Ngaruahine Iwi v. Mountian View Developments

 

Based in the South Taranaki township of Manaia, Ngaruahine Iwi Authority thought it had negotiated a joint venture partnership with Ravikumar Gaddam for construction of social housing in nearby Hawera.  Ngaruahine lodged a caveat to temporarily stop an intended 34 lot subdivision going ahead, alleging Mr Gaddam was siphoning off their money to develop other projects.

The High Court was told Mr Gaddam met with Ngaruahine staff in early 2024 promoting a social housing project off County Drive in Hawera involving his company Mountain View Developments.

Ngaruahine already provides social housing in Manaia, rented to iwi members.

Plans firmed up with Ngaruahine agreeing to buy from Mountain View a half share in County Drive for one million dollars.

Ngaruahine staff told the High Court they were under the impression this was its initial contribution to a joint venture project in which each side would pay half the costs, splitting assets 50/50 on completion.  There was no formal joint venture agreement signed.

Ngaruahine later learnt Mountain View did not have title to the County Drive land at time of Mr Gaddam’s half share sale.

Evidence was given that when agreeing to a part sale to Ngaruahine, Mountain View was in default on its prior agreement to buy the land.  It settled this purchase, late, at the time Ngaruahine paid across its one million dollars.

Mountain View acknowledged it was making a profit on this immediate on-sale of a half share in County Drive, but refused to disclose the profit made.

Raising further concerns for Ngaruahine was news that Mountain View had mortgaged the Country Drive land with no explanation as to where this money was going.

Mountain View unsuccessfully challenged Ngaruahine’s registration of a caveat over County Drive.  A caveat has the effect of freezing all further dealing with the land.

Justice Gendall ruled Ngaruahine has an arguable case that preliminary joint venture discussions created a situation in which County Drive became a trust asset held by Mountain View for the benefit of both joint venture participants.

If proved to be a trust asset at a later court hearing, Mountain View is potentially liable to account for any profits made from the part-sale to Ngaruahine plus financial benefits arising from its borrowing secured over the joint asset.

Mountain View says the only agreement of relevance is the sale of a half share in County Drive to Ngaruahine for one million dollars.  Nothing else was agreed, it says.

Ngaruahine Iwi Authority v. Mountain View Developments and Constructions Ltd – High Court (31.07.25)

25.171

Asset Forfeiture: Commissioner of Police v. Foulds

 

Nearing retirement age, Stephen and Leonna Foulds were busted growing cannabis in an indoor commercial operation at their Opua home, in Northland near Russell.  Pleading guilty and sentenced to home detention, they negotiated a proceeds of crime settlement giving them six months to sell their home, raising $450,000 to be surrendered as proceeds of crime.

The High Court was told they purchased the Opua property in cash for $1.05 million, proceeds from sale of their previous Te Aroha home.  Opua is now estimated to be worth some $1.2 million.

Evidence was given of police in December 2023 finding a sophisticated commercial growing operation at the property capable of producing five crops a year.  High power needs to drive fans, air conditioning and indoor lighting saw their power usage being three to four times the local norm.

The court was told a police check of power records for the Foulds previous Te Aroha property found power usage there similarly well above local averages.

Their Opua home became ‘tainted’ and liable to forfeiture under Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act by reason of cash from cannabis sales used to maintain and refurbish the property.

A Mazda CX-5, purchased with tainted cash was at risk of forfeiture as well.

It was agreed with police that cash generated from cannabis sales approximated $450,000.

The Foulds were given until end of January 2026 to sell their Opua home.  Failing that, Insolvency Service is authorised to carry out a forced sale, paying net surplus to the Foulds after deduction of $450,000.

In the Kaikohe District Court, Mr Foulds was sentenced to ten months home detention for cultivating cannabis and selling, Mrs Foulds eight months for cultivation.

Commissioner of Police v. Foulds – High Court (31.07.25)

25.172

30 July 2025

Asset Forfeiture: Commissioner of Police v. Rivers


Known also as Mai Qu, former chartered accountant Luke Daniel Rivers surrendered one million dollars as part of a court approved proceeds of crime settlement after making false covid-19 wage subsidy applications.  After telling the High Court his repayment proposal was, in part, intended to reduce the severity of a court sentence for fraud, he was subsequently sentenced to nearly six years imprisonment.   

The High Court was told a wage subsidy audit uncovered his fraud.  When claiming subsidies, Rivers described himself as a full-time employee while supposedly working simultaneously for multiple companies.

According to an Inland Revenue media release, he used as cover two separate identities, each with their own IRD number.  One, using his given name of Mai Qu; the other, as Luke Daniel Rivers being the name he adopted by statutory declaration in 2004.

His fraudulent applications also claimed subsidies in names of supposed full-time employees for whom Inland Revenue holds no PAYE tax records.  Other applications were in false names.

Just under $978,000 fraudulently obtained for covid-19 employee support was deposited to bank accounts controlled by Rivers.  None was used to cover employee wages.

He transferred some of these funds to a Singapore bank account he controlled, but in the name of a fake identity.

As part of the agreed Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act settlement, Rivers agreed to repay extra, taking the total for repayment to one million dollars; to ‘demonstrate his remorse,’ Rivers said.   

Approving the settlement, Justice O’Gorman gave Rivers one week to pay.

Failing that, Insolvency Service is to sell two Auckland properties controlled by Rivers, with any surplus returned to Rivers after deductions for mortgages secured over the properties and payment of the one million dollars being surrendered.

Commissioner of Police v. Rivers – High Court (30.07.25)

25.170

28 July 2025

Maori Land: Henderson v. Brooking

 

Apirana Henderson was removed as trustee of a Hicks Bay ahu whenua trust on complaints from a fellow trustee that Mr Henderson had wrongly taken control of trust assets; giving himself an all-expenses paid place to live, with the trust in addition giving him sundry cash handouts.

Mr Henderson showed a complete failure to understand obligations of a trustee, with a series of blatant and repeated breaches of trustee duties, the Court of Appeal said.

Leaving him as trustee risked one family locking up control of trust assets against the interests of its 364 hapu-related beneficial owners, the court said.

The court dismissed claims by Mr Henderson that his actions were an honourable application of tikanga Maori in which rangatira were expected to have close oversight of communal assets.  Instead, trust law principles which prohibit self-dealing by trustees are paramount, the court ruled.

The Wharekahika A47 Trust owns nearly 1200 hectares of Maori freehold land near Hicks Bay on North Island’s East Coast.  With six trustees, it operates as an ahu whenua land-based trust under the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act.  Designed to better facilitate administration of communally-owned assets, the Maori Land Court appoints ahu whenua trustees and supervises trust operations.

Trustee Ashley Brooking challenged a series of deals which benefitted fellow trustee, Apirana Henderson.

In 2018, Mr Henderson promoted an arrangement in which the trust paid him $10,000; a supposed reward for his efforts in removing a long-term lessee from trust land and time spent making good on deferred maintenance.  A further payment of $5000 followed three years later.

In 2019, he had four trustees, including himself, sign authorisation for him to occupy a house on trust land with the trust to pay rates, petrol, internet, power and mobile phone charges.

Mr Brooking complained that this informal approval amounted to approval given by Mr Henderson himself and by two of his siblings who are also trustees.

In addition, a loosely worded ‘proposal,’ set out future payments for various work including stock management and fencing.  There was no commitment to actually do any of this work.

The court was told Mr Henderson did not get formal approval from all trustees, or approval from trust beneficiaries, for these self-interested deals.

Warned by trust lawyers of the potential consequences of trustee self-dealing, Mr Henderson chose to repay that part of an insurance premium paid by the trust which provided insurance cover for his own personal assets.

A 2022 Maori Land Court hearing saw Mr Henderson removed as trustee on grounds he had improperly used trustee powers for his own personal benefit.  This decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.

It is not a question of the court simply exercising a discretion to remove an ahu whenua trustee, the Court of Appeal said.  When poor behaviour by a trustee reaches a certain threshold, removal follows automatically, it ruled.

Mr Henderson’s rights to any payment for his services required him first to negotiate a contract of employment with the trust, the Court of Appeal said.  Agreed payments then would be validly received as an employee; rather than wrongly taken as a trustee.

The Court of Appeal pointed out that the Maori Land Court had suggested, when removing Mr Henderson as trustee, that he then be offered a five year management contract.

This was not to Mr Henderson’s liking.  He chose to appeal, unsuccessfully challenging the court’s power to dismiss him as trustee.

Henderson v. Brooking – Court of Appeal (28.07.25)

25.169

25 July 2025

Leaky Home: Turret Trustees v. Profit

 

It is a pyrrhic victory.  Previous owners sold their Auckland leaky home for $1.01 million before disappearing overseas, leaving Scott Meads family trust holding an $883,000 High Court order for damages, but little chance of full recovery.

The Meads family trust, Turret Trustees Ltd, purchased a Cathedral Place property in Parnell for $1.01 million in 2016.  It is a 1990s monolithic plaster-clad townhouse.

Before settling their purchase, the Meads discovered a new roof had been installed.  There were doubts whether installation required Building Act consent and whether it was code-compliant.

A sum of $175,000 was held back in their lawyer’s trust account until this was sorted out.

After shifting in, the Meads found evidence of ongoing water ingress.  They learnt previous owners Francois Profit and Laure Tsobny had carried out substantial remediation work: replacing rotten timber wall framing and rotting particle flooring; and recoating exterior walls with a further layer of plaster.

The Meads shifted out while repairs were made.

In the High Court, Justice Becroft ruled Mr Profit and Ms Tsobny were in breach of contract.

They signed an agreement for sale and purchase containing a standard clause promising they had obtained any necessary building consents for work done.

Evidence was given that the extent of remedial work they carried out did require consent.

Justice Becroft awarded damages for breach of contract totalling $883,000: including $800,000 for the cost of bringing the property up to consented standard; $53,000 for rent lost to the family trust whilst the Meads moved out; and $30,000 general damages for stress, anxiety and inconvenience.

He ordered that the $175,000 still held in a lawyer’s trust account, plus accrued interest, be handed over to the Meads’ family trust in part payment.

Mr Profit and Ms Tsobny did not defend the claim.  Recovery of the balance from them may prove difficult, Justice Becroft said.  Ms Tsobny has returned to Cameroon.  Mr Profit is believed to be in France.

Turret Trustees Ltd v. Profit – High Court (25.07.25)

25.168

22 July 2025

Lease: Stills v. McCormack

 

Arrears of rent and failure to challenge a rent review cost the Stills family rights to renew their lease of land at Little Akaloa on Banks Peninsular, losing rights to use a rudimentary bach on the property after the family’s near fifty year occupation.

Andrew Stills argued their family was victim of a stitch-up; claiming rights to purchase were ignored, and further alleging fraud in a mix-up over rights of way giving access to their bach on Lukes Road.

The High Court was told land on Lukes Road at Little Akaloa was bequeathed to the Anglican Church in the 1950s.  Subdivided lots were then leased out by the Church on renewable twenty-one year leases.

The Stills family came to occupy 36D Lukes Road in 1975.  Their leasehold interest passed down through the generations.

Tensions arose within the Stills family; some wedded to the family history, others interested in selling to neighbours Robert and Elizabeth McCormack.

The McCormacks have a holiday home on a neighbouring site.  Mr McCormack founded Christchurch real estate firm Harcourts Grenadiers.

Matters reached a head following the McCormacks 2021 purchase of the Anglican Church’s freehold interest in 36D Lukes Road.  The Stills current twenty-one year lease for 36D was up for renewal in March 2022.

Their rights of renewal were disputed.

Andrew Stills led the charge, arguing unsuccessfully in the High Court that the Church had ignored what the Stills claimed was a right of first refusal should the Church sell its freehold.

Evidence was given that the McCormacks paid $400,000 to purchase the freehold for 36D.  The Stills offered $160,000.

Mr Stills argued there had been duplicity between the Church and the McCormacks in that earlier land title registrations removed any record of the Stills’ then existing legal right of access through their neighbour’s land to their bach at 36D.

With no enforceable legal access, the land at 36D was worth nothing, he said. Rent due should now be zero, Mr Stills claimed.

Evidence was given that these legal rights of access have been reinstated, after valuers pointed out an obvious error in not carrying forward an easement on the title years previously, when new land titles were issued.

There was no evidence of fraud, Justice Osborne ruled.

The Stills family made no formal response to the McCormacks’ 2022 rent review, which offered a further twenty-one year lease renewal at an annual rental of $28,080.  Capital value of 36D was assessed at $432,000 in August 2021.

Rent under the then current twenty-one year lease was in arrears.  Mr Stills said this was because invoices were sent to the wrong email address.

In the High Court, Justice Osborne said it is the leaseholder’s responsibility to ensure rent is paid, regardless of whether invoices are received or not.

Being late in paying rent, plus a failure to engage in the rent review process, meant the Stills’ lease expired in March 2022, without renewal.

The Stills became trespassers by remaining in possession.  The McCormacks, as owners of the freehold, were entitled to take possession of 36D, Justice Osborne ruled.

The Stills were ordered to pay a $60,450 occupation rent for the period running from the March 2022 expiry of their lease.

Stills v. McCormack – High Court (17.08.23 & 22.07.25)

25.167

18 July 2025

Cryptocurrency: re Digital Asset Exchange

 

With cryptocurrency exchange Dasset in liquidation, and users facing an apparent six million dollar shortfall, liquidators have High Court approval to treat the $600,000 remaining as trust assets to be divided pro rata between unpaid customers.  Co-founder Stephen Macaskill has gone to ground; believed now to be overseas.  A Serious Fraud Office investigation into Dasset operations is underway. 

Digital Asset Exchange Ltd, trading as Dasset, was established in 2017 as an online trading platform with the stated aim of being a custodial trustee, holding individual currency and crypto-currency accounts on behalf of customers.

Dasset offered to action trades on behalf of customers, promising transactions would be recorded under each users name.  This did not happen.

Liquidators have found that Dasset simply dumped all currency and crypto-currency holdings into one bucket.  Poor record keeping meant specific assets could not be identified as held on behalf of any one customer.

Dasset’s liquidators have identified unauthorised and unrecorded withdrawals totalling some five million USD were actioned in the three years prior to Dasset’s 2023 liquidation.

A further complication facing liquidators is that customer trades were executed by Dasset through a master account held with third party provider Bittrex.  Mr Macaskill alone holds the digital master key.

Operations by US-based Bittrex are currently being wound down.  Its crypto-currency exchanges in Lichenstein and Bermuda are both in liquidation.

The High Court was told Dasset liquidators suspect that company operations collapsed at some point into a ponzi scheme.  Customers asking for their positions to be cashed out were paid from new money coming in, leaving user accounts unreconciled.

Dasset has about 5000 registered users.

The High Court approved liquidators’ application for all funds recovered to be held in one pool, with users to be paid pro-rata on the basis of how much they are owed.

Poor record keeping by Dasset meant this was the only pragmatic approach, Justice Gendall ruled.

These funds, currently totalling some $600,000, are trust assets, not available to meet claims by Dasset’s trade creditors, he further ruled.  Wording of Dasset’s contracts with customers promised their money would be held separately, in trust, with Dasset as custodian.

Liquidators have given Dasset’s registered users until 10 November 2025 to file proof of how much they are owed.  Late applications risk missing out on any pro rata payout.

re Digital Asset Exchange Ltd – High Court (18.07.25)

25.164

Bankruptcy: Greig v. Official Assignee

 

Described on Precision Real Estate’s website as selling real estate since 1989 and having an impeccable reputation, David Greig remained bankrupt for fourteen years before the High Court in 2025 granted his discharge from bankruptcy, subject to a period of court monitored financial supervision.  He disputes Insolvency Service warned him there was no exit from bankruptcy until he filed a statement listing all assets and liabilities.

David Robert Greig was bankrupted by Inland Revenue in 2011 for unpaid tax debts of $152,300.  All up, creditor claims totalled $222,500.  Unsecured creditors received nothing.

Insolvency Act allows automatic discharge from bankruptcy after three years.  This three year period runs from the date a bankrupt files with Insolvency Service a statement of affairs listing all assets and liabilities.

Insolvency Service told the High Court Mr Grieg did not file his statement of affairs until December 2023, and then only after an Insolvency Service prompt nearly twelve months previously that he remained bankrupt until this information was supplied.  Insolvency Service told the High Court Mr Greig had ignored previous reminders.

He denies receiving earlier reminders.  Mr Greig says he presumed bankruptcy ended in 2014, three years from his 2011 bankruptcy adjudication.

The High Court was told Mr Greig travelled to Australia six times during his bankruptcy, in breach of Insolvency Act rules prohibiting overseas travel without Insolvency Service approval.

In both 2015 and 2022, Inland Revenue asked Insolvency Service to confirm that Mr Grieg as an undischarged bankrupt had Insolvency Service approval to be self-employed.  He was claiming to be self-employed for tax purposes.  The High Court was told he did not have approval.

Inland Revenue had become concerned about the level of tax debts being run up by Mr Greig.  He was not responding to messages and emails, it said.

The High Court was told there are currently substantial tax arrears unpaid.

Having belatedly filed a statement of affairs in 2023 to comply with his 2011 bankruptcy, Mr Greig then sought High Court approval for an early discharge from his bankruptcy otherwise timed for automatic discharge in late 2026.

Associate Judge Cogswell approved an Insolvency Act conditional discharge agreed between Insolvency Service and Mr Greig.

Whilst no longer bankrupt, Mr Greig when working as salesperson with Takapuna-based Precision Real Estate must keep tax payments up to date, must bank tax withholding payments and GST obligations to a separate bank account and must have his financial affairs monitored by an independent accountant.  This accountant must report every six months to the court and to Insolvency Service.

These special conditions expire in December 2026.

Greig v. Official Assignee – High Court (18.07.25)

25.166

Insurance: Work v. IAG

 

The High Court dismissed Peter Work’s insurance claim on grounds that he remotely triggered an electrical circuit primed to start the fire which destroyed his Wellington rental.  His appeal to review potential causes for the fire was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

Technical evidence about residue left at seat of the blaze and operation of circuit breakers were at issue.

Ten years after the 2013 house fire, the High Court ruled IAG Insurance was justified in refusing payment.  Mr Work deliberately triggered the fire and then dishonestly claimed it was an accident, the trial judge decided.

Mr Work is a mechanical engineer.  He was in Whanganui on night of the fire.

Evidence was given of fire investigators identifying seat of the blaze in a garage converted into a bedroom, near a computer, printer and standing lamp.

IAG was suspicious.

Mr Work was under financial pressure.  He did not have sufficient funds to remediate the rental property before putting it on the market.  Power to the property had been disconnected, since it was vacant, yet just prior to the fire, power was reconnected to two circuits within the house connected to the room where the fire started.

Analysis of Mr Work’s computer found he had purchased software allowing remote logins to a linked computer in the weeks prior to the fire.

The trial judge accepted evidence from IAG that Mr Work triggered the fire from his Whanganui computer with a command causing the computer print function to activate in Wellington, and with it have the printer pull out a piece of pre-placed Sellotape opening an electrical circuit linked to a nearby lamp, all designed to cause a fire.

Witnesses saw the house on fire within fifteen minutes of the print function being executed remotely.

IAG suspicions were further heightened when Mr Work belatedly admitted to the Sellotape-rigged print mechanism, explaining it as a prank.  It was intended to surprise family members when the light turned on, apparently spontaneously.  The fire was not intended; it was an accident, he claimed.

The trial judge dismissed this explanation as an unbelievable fabrication, seeking to explain away damning evidence unearthed by insurance investigators.

Mr Work claimed in the Court of Appeal that investigators drew the wrong conclusions from fire residue.

The Court of Appeal ruled it was too late to challenge this evidence.  At the High Court trial, Mr Work knew the substance of the investigators’ theory of how the fire started.  That was the time to challenge this explanation.

Work v. IAG New Zealand Ltd – Court of Appeal (18.07.25)

25.165

17 July 2025

Estate: Barry v. Bradshaw

 

With Brian Nikora leaving an estate valued at a little under $230,000 his widow from a fifty-five year marriage challenged Family Protection Act claims against the estate made by two daughters from his previous relationship.  The Court of Appeal reviewed how all claims could be accommodated, after the High Court effectively awarded Brian’s entire estate to his daughters.

Brian died in 2021.  He had been in rest home care for the last thirty months of his life.

His only asset of note was his half share in the home where he had lived with now widowed Sally Barry.  Under his will, this half share passed to Sally, giving her full ownership.  The two had no children.

The court was told Sally had provided most of the income during their marriage, and had used her redundancy payment to pay off loans.

Family Protection Act claims were made against Brian’s estate by his two daughters from an earlier relationship: Karen and Annmarie.  They did not receive any benefit under their father’s will.

The court was told Brian had minimal involvement in their lives.  His relationship with their mother ended in the 1960s, before the younger daughter was born.  He stopped paying maintenance within a few years.

Mother, and the two daughters, moved to Australia about a decade later.

Children can make a Family Protection Act claim against a parent’s estate where the parent’s will failed to provide ‘proper maintenance and support.’

Courts have given this phrase a double meaning: imposing a moral obligation on parents to recognise parent/child relationships in some manner on their death; plus, requiring parents to assist, on death, an improvident child in financial need.

Judges have a wide discretion as to how these potentially conflicting interests might be reconciled, whilst still seeking to avoid any wholesale re-writing of a person’s will.

This wide discretion has led lawyers to caution clients that the outcome of any Family Protection Act claim can depend on the ‘state of the judge’s digestion.’

In the High Court, Karen and Annmarie were each awarded their father’s half share of the home, with widow Sally given a life interest in this half share allowing her to remain in occupation of the family home.  In addition, the judge awarded the two daughters $80,000 each, to be paid on Sally’s death, or sale of the home, whichever occurred earlier.

The Court of Appeal overturned this ruling: allowing widow Sally to retain full ownership of the home; removing any payment to Karen; and awarding a reduced bequest of $30,000 to Annemarie.

Looking ahead, the court said Brian’s estate is relatively modest and his widow’s position requires protection.  Brian’s primary duty was to ensure his widow had somewhere to live following his death, particularly given the length of their relationship.

Sally was 77 at date of her husband’s death.  It is likely most, if not all, of the equity in their home might be needed to later buy into a retirement village or to pay for rest home care, the court said.

The court was told daughter Karen and her husband are comfortably off financially.  She had occasional contact with her father, then regular social contact in his latter years, through telephone calls and facetime messaging.  She and her husband had made several visits to see her father New Zealand.

The Court of Appeal ruled that whilst Brian had failed in his moral duty to recognise daughter Karen in his will, the modest size of his estate and the number of competing claims precluded her receiving even a modest Family Protection Act award.

The court was told Annemarie, by contrast, requires financial help.  She is divorced, living on an unemployment benefit and in poor health.

She had limited contact with her father after shifting to Australia.  She only learnt of her father’s illness prior to his death through her own daughter, who was then living in New Zealand.

Her receipt of the court-ordered $30,000 Family Protection Act compensation is delayed until the earlier of Sally’s death or sale of the home.

Barry v. Bradshaw – Court of Appeal (17.07.25)

25.162

Estate: re Estate Thomas Southgate

 

A High Court order removed Annie Cameron from control of her de facto spouse’s estate after allegations she left the estate insolvent by drawing down funds without paying estate debts.  Wellington lawyer Bryce Williams was appointed to investigate.

Children of the late Thomas Southgate allege Annie hopelessly mixed up the assets of their late father and his family trust.

Annie is sole beneficiary of Thomas Southgate’s estate.  He was her de facto spouse.  Thomas died in 2024.

Her claim to also be a beneficiary of his 2002 family trust is disputed.  Thomas’ children Janene and Todd are named beneficiaries.

It is claimed Thomas Southgate’s estate owes his family trust some $220,000.

The High Court was told the 2002 family trust was set up to benefit Thomas Southgate’s children and grandchildren.

His home on Convent Road in Otaki was transferred to the Trust.

The following year Thomas met Annie.  She joined him at Convent Road.

Convent Road was sold by the Trust in 2005, to Thomas and Annie as joint owners.

Trust beneficiaries say no money changed hands.  They say the purchase price was left as a debt owed the Trust; a debt which has never been repaid, they claim.

The High Court was told the Trust as at March 2023 had assets totalling nearly $940,000, of which $220,000 is an estate debt owed the Trust.

Since Thomas Southgate’s death in 2024, his children have been unable to get clear answers from Annie about payments and withdrawals made through both the Trust’s and the Estate’s bank accounts.

The Estate currently holds about $25,000 cash.  It is insolvent, unable to repay $220,000 owed the Family Trust, trust beneficiaries Janene and Todd allege.

In the High Court, Justice Grau said an inherent conflict of interest exists.

Annie, as executor of the Thomas Southgate estate, is being asked to account for her actions.  At the same time, she is being asked to account for her disputed involvement in Trust financial activities when it is claimed the Estate owes the Trust $220,000.

Independent oversight is required, Justice Gau ruled.

Lawyer Bryce Williams was appointed administrator of Thomas Southgate’s estate, given authority to uplift the will and to investigate prior estate transactions.

Janene and Todd were critical of Annie’s obstructive behaviour, forcing a court application for her removal.  In the end, Annie did not appear in court to challenge the need for an independent investigation.

re Estate Thomas Edrich Southgate – High Court (17.07.25)

25.163

16 July 2025

Charity: re NZ Medical Association

 

At a time when all parts of the health sector are lobbying for increased funding, the High Court was told a medical charity set up to support impecunious general practitioners was being hived off because there were no current applications for financial support and that ‘medical practitioners are generally well-off with few doctors and their families facing financial distress.’

Tracing its origins back to 1896, New Zealand Medical Benevolent Fund assets are being handed on to the Hauora Taiwhenua Rural Health Network on the liquidation of Fund trustee: New Zealand Medical Association Inc.

Documents filed on liquidation of the trustee indicate some $872,000 is being handed over to Hauora Taiwhenua.

High Court approval was needed for the transfer because the Medical Benevolent Fund is a charitable trust.

The legal nicety is that a charitable trust must have a continuing purpose.  It must either exhaust all its resources in furtherance of its charitable aims, or pass on its endowment to a charity having similar purposes.

Charitable Trusts Act court approval is required to ensure any transfer of funds continues to implement donors’ original purpose.

The High Court was told the Medical Benevolent Fund had become trustee of two merged medical charities: an 1896 friendly society in which general practitioners paid an annual subscription to fund temporary financial support and pensions for practitioners in need; and, an Auckland-based benevolent fund established during World War Two to similarly assist local medical practitioners needing financial assistance.

The 1896 friendly society contributed just over $430,000 to combined funds at time of the 2015 merger.

The High Court has approved transfer of Medical Benevolent trust funds across to Hauora Taiwhenua Rural health, on condition Hauora’s trust deed specify any subsequent transfer be referred back to the High Court for further Charitable Trusts Act approval.

Hauora Taiwhenua was founded by a group of Canterbury rural doctors in 1987.

Wording of its trust deed leaves open the possibility of health workers other than general practitioners receiving financial benefits.

re New Zealand Medical Association Inc – High Court (16.07.25)

25.161

Maori Land: Brown v. Brown

 

Allowing whanau to live rent free on Northland Maori land did not give rights of permanent occupation, with the Maori Land Court ordering Pompey Brown leave a Kaikohe property owned by his half-brother.

The home at Taheke Road, on outskirts of Kaikohe, is Maori freehold land.

Rights over Maori freehold land are an amalgam of customary Maori land law and English-based property law.

Those holding title to Maori freehold land have rights of individual ownership, but any offers to sell must first be made to blood relatives.

Pompey Brown came to occupy Taheke Road after his sister had lived there rent free for nearly twenty years.  Ownership lies with his younger half-brother Clarence, who was named in their father’s will as the one to inherit.

The Maori Land Court was told Clarence agreed Pompey could shift into Taheke Road to look after his sister’s possessions when she moved into residential care.  Pompey did not have to pay rent.  He did have to pay rates.

Clarence told the Land Court that Pompey was asked to leave in mid-2024.  Clarence took over payment of rates from that date.

Pompey refused to leave.  He clams ancestral rights to the land, by descent through his mother.  He aggressively resisted any suggestions he leave.

Pompey claims his ancestral rights were recognised in 1996 when the Maori Land Court refused Clarence’s application to change the status of Taheke Road from Maori freehold land to general land.  The judge refused re-registration to general land, saying this would allow Clarence to sell to any person, removing his existing obligation to offer blood relatives from his father’s first marriage a chance to purchase.

Clarence’s rights to ownership of Taheke Road come from terms of his father’s will.

This bequest of Maori freehold land to a son is recognised and protected by the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act, Judge Williams ruled.

As owner, Clarence has rights to possession.

By refusing to leave, Pompey was trespassing.

Pompey was ordered to leave within seven days, was not to cause any damage on his departure and was further ordered not to return to the property.

Brown v. Brown – Maori Land Court (16.07.25)

25.160

15 July 2025

Estate: Dolan v. Dolan

 

In the weeks before his assisted death, Mark Dolan transferred a half-share of his family home to his spouse and all but disinherited his daughters from an earlier relationship.  His brother Matthew had the High Court halt further transactions, in advance of a challenge to widow Erin’s role on this transfer of ownership.

Mark Dolan died in August 2024.  His brother alleges long-standing arrangements allowing Mark’s daughters to inherit on his death were changed as a result of both Erin’s undue influence and Mark’s lack of capacity to make decisions in the days prior to his death.

The High Court was told of a Property (Relationships) Act agreement signed by Mark and Erin in 2017 setting out entitlements to an Auckland property then owned by Mark alone.

It was agreed that title would be changed, with each to then hold a half share as tenants in common.  Erin agreed to accept liability on an existing mortgage.

Holding title as tenants in common meant that Mark’s half share would form part of his estate on death.

The court was told that a fortnight before Mark’s death, title was changed to have the two registered as joint tenants.  This meant Erin assumed full ownership, by survivorship, on Mark’s death.  His half share no longer formed part of his estate.

Mark also re-wrote his will just prior to his death.

The law firm he regularly dealt with advised him that his daughters would likely claim against his estate if there was no provision for them in his will.

Evidence was given that Mark went to a different firm of lawyers two days later, signing a will leaving virtually all his estate to Erin, with his daughters to share a little over $20,000 held in his Kiwisaver account.

Brother Matthew is named as executor of Mark’s will.

Learning that Mark’s daughters intended to make a claim against their late father’s estate, Matthew acted quickly, lodging a caveat against title to the Auckland property.

A caveat prevents any further dealings with the title.

Widow Erin challenged registration of the caveat.

In the High Court, Associate Judge Lester ruled the caveat remain, pending a hearing into circumstances in which ownership of the Auckland property was converted from a tenancy in common to a joint tenancy.

There was medical evidence of Mark feeling weak, dizzy and generally exhausted in the days prior to his death.  There was also evidence of Erin as the one engaging with lawyers to achieve a change in ownership.

Erin claims terms of their 2017 relationship property agreement give her rights of full ownership on Mark’s death.

Dolan v. Dolan – High Court (15.07.25)

25.159