Family Trust: Nath v. Nath

  

What started as a prudent decision to place their South Auckland family home into trust as protection against business creditors turned into a sibling standoff with Roneel Nath treating the Alfriston property as his own; not paying rent to the trust, allowing the property to run down, and failing to account for rent paid by tenants occupying a smaller dwelling on site.

Justice Gault ordered the property be sold and the Nath Brothers Family Trust wound up. 

Roneel and brother Vicky Nath are the two trustees.  They are named, together with their mother Sunil Lata, as the Trust’s primary beneficiaries.

The High Court was told their family trust was established in 2013.  Initially, it operated as an investment trust; buying and later selling a property in Mangere East.   

In 2016, the family home on Everlea Place was transferred into the Trust.

Their mother continued living there after transfer to trust ownership, together with son Roneel and his family. 

A decade later, the relationship between brothers Roneel and Vicky had become decidedly frosty.

Claims Roneel was letting the property fall into disrepair and failing to account for rentals received were major points of friction.

Vicky said his brother refused to enter into discussions.  He refused to countenance any winding up of their Trust, Vicky said.

The High Court was told their mother supported Vicky’s plans to terminate the Trust.

With the trustees deadlocked, Justice Gault used Trusts Act powers to order a sale of Everlea Place and termination of the Trust.

Evidence was given that net equity in Everlea Place is some $2.2 million.

Justice Gault ordered payments be made from proceeds of sale to reimburse beneficiary loans made to the Trust: Vicky ($311,050); Roneel ($141,912); and their mother ($265,520).

He further ordered reimbursement of any expenses incurred by Vicky and his mother on repairs to put the property into a saleable state, up to a maximum of $95,000 as set out in a repair schedule presented to the court.

The net balance is to be divided three ways between the major beneficiaries: Sunil Lata and her two sons.

Roneel was ordered to provide a verified statement of account for rentals received from the minor dwelling on the property.  Should he fail to do so, Vicky and his mother are to each receive $105 for every week the dwelling was rented out, deducted from Roneel’s share on termination of the Trust.

Roneel did not defend his brother’s court application to wind up the Trust.

Nath v. Nath – High Court (20.11.25)

26.014

Trespass: Pipiriki Township v. Cripps

  

Maori Land Court referenced concepts of mana inherent in ownership of Maori Land, departing from English land law concepts of trespass, when ordering Jay Cripps pack up and leave his unauthorised commercial campsite, operating on the Whanganui River near Pipiriki.

The court was told Jay Cripps has been squatting on the site for over a decade.  Ownership lies with local Maori incorporation: Pipiriki Township No 1.

The legal difficulty facing Pipiriki Township, seeking to force Mr Cripps out, is that the campsite is on land currently leased for forestry on a 99 year lease to Waimarino Forests Ltd.

Pipiriki Township faced an apparently unsurmountable legal hurdle: land law rules inherited from England hinder owners of leased land seeking to trespass anyone.  A lease gives the lessee rights of possession; it is for the lessee to enforce its rights of possession by suing squatters for trespass.

Waimarino Forests told the Maori Land Court that while no permission had been given Mr Cripps to operate his commercial campsite on the leased land, it was not interested as lessee in incurring legal expenses ejecting him.  Ultimate ownership of Waimarino lies with investors in British Virgin Islands and Singapore.

In the Maori Land Court, Judge Warren pointed out that the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act imported into New Zealand statute law concepts of Maori tikanga going beyond the English law concept of land ownership simply being control over an economic asset.

For Maori, land in customary ownership is more than just an economic asset; it reflects the genealogy, the history and the mana of its current owners. 

Having Mr Cripps operate a business on leased Pipiriki land, without Maori landowners’ consent, caused spiritual and reputational damage to Pipiriki owners, Judge Warren said.

Pipiriki had no control over how Mr Cripps cared for their land or told their stories.

Departing from the general law of trespass, Judge Warren ruled Pipiriki Township could sue to trespass Mr Cripps from his campsite, despite Pipiriki having no rights of possession to the land during Waimarino Forests’ 99 year lease.

Mr Cripps was given two months to clear all structures from the site, and ordered to then leave permanently.

Pipiriki Township No. 1 Inc v. Cripps – Maori Land Court (19.11.25)

26.013

Investment: South Hyde Consulting v. SPSS Group

  

Initially it looked like a match made in heaven with Glenn Jenkin’s SPSS Group linking up with Tim Blake’s South Hyde Consulting, given their joint interest in sporting apparel and outdoor activities.  It fell apart within months.

Tim Blake promotes hunting and walking tours based out of Kaikoura.  Glenn Jenkins specialises in sports, fitness and apparel brands.

The two joined forces in a series of agreements culminating in a 2023 deal seeing Blake’s South Hyde agreeing to put up $200,000 as its share of a limited liability partnership.

The deal quickly collapsed.

At the start, South Hyde was required to front with only $175,000 cash of its promised $200,000; the balance ‘paid’ by way of Mr Blake taking a $25,000 salary sacrifice.

The District Court was told early enthusiasm turned to disillusionment.

Mr Blake was taken on at a $100,000 salary.  Mr Jenkins alleged poor profitability was caused by Mr Blake’s overspending and poor decision-making.

For Mr Jenkins, the last straw was Mr Blake’s South Hyde suing to recover its $200,000 investment.

Investment terms gave South Hyde a put option; requiring Mr Jenkin’s SPSS Group to buy it out of the partnership at $200,000 if demanded at any time within the first twelve months.

There was no dispute this put option was valid.

Mr Jenkins countered that Mr Blake’s departure from the business within six months was in breach of his employment contract; damages for poor performance and early departure should be set off against any return of the $200,000 investment.

Mr Jenkins personally argued his case.

Judge Hunt ruled Mr Jenkins had failed to recognise the investment deal was entirely separate from Mr Blake’s employment contract.

Mr Blake’s employment contract, whatever its terms, was between Mr Blake and their investment vehicle of choice: the limited liability partnership.

The put option was between different parties: investors SPSS Group and South Hyde; parties separate from the disputed employment contract.

Terms of their original investment did not set out conditions for employment of Mr Blake.

No counter claim could apply.  A counter claim requires mutuality.

SPSS was ordered to pay the $200,000 due South Hyde under its put option, regardless of any separate employment dispute between their partnership and Mr Blake.

South Hyde Consulting & Investments Ltd v. Speed Power & Stability Systems Manufacturing Ltd – District Court (18.11.25)

26.012

Fraud: Kea Investments Ltd v. Wikeley

  

Ken Wikeley failed in his attempt to avoid contempt of court charges and bankruptcy, seeking a court-brokered deal.  He is seemingly left as the fall guy in a fraudulent transaction allegedly cooked up by entrepreneur Eric Watson and apparently designed to siphon funds from Sir Owen Glenn’s Kea Investments.

Kea Investments Ltd has launched litigation in three different countries to unwind what New Zealand courts ruled was a fraudulently obtained US court order by Wikeley’s family trust after a Kentucky court ordered Kea pay USD123 million, supposedly for breach of contract.  No such debt is owed, New Zealand courts ruled.

The presence of Eric Watson lurks in the background, with allegations he engineered the fraud.

In separate litigation, in the United Kingdom, Mr Watson is strongly resisting payment of GBP129 million an England court ordered he pay Sir Owen.

Currently, Mr Wikeley has lost control of his family trust, now in the hands of interim liquidators.  He faces contempt of court charges filed in Queensland and is threatened with bankruptcy for non-payment of court-ordered costs.  His Australian passport has been impounded, preventing travel.

Desperate to extricate himself from this legal morass, Mr Wikeley asked the High Court in New Zealand to convene a judicial settlement conference to approve a possible settlement.

High Court rules allow litigants to negotiate an out of court settlement presided over by a judge.  This can short-cut both court-scheduling delays and expensive drawn-out court hearings.

Judicial settlement conferences are not common.  By the time a dispute is ready for trial, both sides are at daggers drawn; compromise is unlikely.

Justice Gault refused to order a judicial settlement conference.

Kea Investments was not interested.  It is looking to enforce current court rulings against Mr Wikeley.

The High Court was told Mr Wikeley is offering to have the fraudulent Kentucky court ruling overturned, saving Kea the expense of proving in a US court all the facts already heard by a New Zealand court; this support in return for Kea Investments abandoning all current litigation against him personally.

The fraudulent Kentucky litigation was not taken in the name of Mr Wikeley personally; it is in the name of his Wikeley Family Trust.  This Trust was not part of the proposed judicial settlement conference.  Mr Wikeley no longer controls his family trust.  It would not be bound by any promises he made to have the Kentucky court ruling overturned, Justice Gault said.

Kea Investments Ltd v. Wikeley – High Court (17.11.25)

26.009

Executor: re Estate Maria Vogelbein

  

Wolfgang Vogelbein’s dogged refusal to carry out terms of his late wife’s will resulted in removal as executor after claiming her estate should be managed following a ‘process control approach’ informed by his qualifications in chemistry and thermodynamics.

Maria Vogelbein died in 2022.  Probate of her will was granted to three executors, required to act jointly: Mr Vogelbein plus two partners in Te Awamutu law firm Edmonds Judd.

Her estate consists of bank accounts and term deposits totalling some $200,000 together with her half share in their Kihkihi home.  Their half interests are held as tenants-in-common.  Maria’s half share does not pass to her widowed spouse; it remains part of her estate.

Her will gives Wolfgang a life interest in her half share, allowing him uninterrupted possession of their Kihikihi home, with her half share passing on Wolfgang’s death to her daughter from an earlier relationship. 

The High Court was told lawyers at Edmonds Judd found it impossible to progress the estate.

Wolfgang did not sign documents necessary to change control of Maria’s bank accounts.

He claimed to own a three-quarter share of their Kihikihi home, rather than one half; the consequence of extra funds provided personally to renovate the property, he claimed.

He further claimed a 1989 pre-nuptial agreement signed in South Africa applied to their property rights.

He flatly refused to insure the Kihikihi property, stating he fundamentally disagrees with the concept of insurance.  Later accepting the will specifically required insurance cover over his late wife’s share of the property, now held in trust, he demanded that the insurance not extend to the share he owned.

His fellow executors told the High Court it is totally impracticable to insure an undivided half interest in property.

Executors from Edmonds Judd offered to withdraw as executors, provided Mr Vogelbein was removed.

Associate Judge Sussock said it was expedient that all three executors be removed.  Corporate trustee Comac Trustees Ltd was appointed in their place.

re Estate of Maria Vogelbein – High Court (17.11.25)

26.011

Undue Influence: re Estate of Johan de Rooy

  

He was a passive gentle man, according to the evidence; she a strong domineering personality.  The High Court ruled invalid because of her undue influence Johan de Rooy’s 2021 will which left his Whangarei property to former spouse Alaine Jeanette Coleman, known variously as Jeanette, Ali and Alaine.

Justice Brewer described Ms Coleman as taking active steps in the years prior to Johan’s 2021 death to isolate Johan from former friends and acquaintances, blocking access by members of his church, instigating both the dismissal of his former lawyer and cancellation of a power of attorney in favour of his brother, and then arranging for Johan to sign a new will two months before his death, leaving all to her.

Ms Coleman represented herself at trial.  Justice Brewer stated she did so with some skill, demonstrating a fierce intelligence and great determination.

One of Johan’s brothers challenged validity of the 2021 will.  He claimed Ms Coleman is controlling and manipulative.

The High Court was told Johan and Alaine married in 2006.  He was aged 54; she is the older by four years.  Johan had lived with his mother until she went into care just prior to her death.

Their marriage was punctuated by Ms Coleman obtaining a protection order against Johan in 2008, then Johan made subject to a two year supervision order in 2009 on charges he pleaded guilty to, later claiming he ‘confessed’ to offences manufactured by Ms Coleman after she threatened to leave him, followed by a short period in prison for supposed breaches of the earlier protection order, with the District Court later dismissing her claims of violence.

Johan was later discovered to have earlier suffered an undiagnosed stroke.

This stroke led him to become dependent on Ms Coleman for aspects of his daily care.  He later claimed that through her coercive behaviour she had him confess to immoral and illegal acts he had never committed.

They divorced in 2014.

Johan’s brother claimed in court that Ms Coleman later regained control of Johan’s life on learning he was terminally ill with brain cancer.

She claimed they had remained in regular contact since their 2014 divorce; that they had never really separated and that John had deceived his relatives about their ongoing relationship.

Changes to his will, leaving all to her, reflected his belated acknowledgment of their ongoing relationship, she claimed.

In the High Court, Justice Brewer stated Ms Coleman has a propensity for controlling the narrative, creating a formal record favourable to herself.

Her informal interaction in one instance with Johan’s former lawyer was followed up with an email painting the lawyer as an interfering meddler, accompanied by threats of a complaint being laid with the Law Society.

A glowing testimonial attesting to her ongoing care of Johan, drafted by Ms Coleman and signed by the vicar of their church, was coloured by the fact, unknown to the vicar, that the two were in fact divorced.

Justice Brewer commented that a short video shown at Johan’s funeral which featured him praising Ms Coleman did not have Johan looking directly at the camera; instead, Johan frequently looked off to one side, the inference being Ms Coleman was present, he said.

The 2021 will in favour of Ms Coleman was ruled invalid on grounds of undue influence. Justice Brewer granted probate to an earlier 2011 will, dividing Johan’s estate between his four siblings.

The estate’s major asset is a residential unit in Whangarei.

re Estate of Johan Frans de Rooy – High Court (13.11.25)

26.010

Ban: Business & Innovation v. Wallace

  

Ministry of Business asked for an indefinite ban on 68 year old fraudster Richard Mark Wallace ever again being involved in the car trade, given his near sixty fraud offences spanning thirty years and two jail terms.  In the District Court, a just expired five year ban was extended for a further five years, in light of his recidivist behaviour.

Employment in the car trade requires licensing under the Motor Vehicle Sales Act; participants need to satisfy a ‘fit and proper’ test.

Wallace has an extensive record of fraud and dishonesty, most recently using multiple aliases selling ‘ghost cars’ through online platforms such as TradeMe.  He is currently required to pay fifty dollars per fortnight in reparations across multiple victims.

Wallace told the District Court he is unable to get regular employment because of his criminal history.  He said a Mr David Duke, who manages a business named as NB Cars, was willing to take him on as an independent contractor, providing intensive supervision.

Greater income will enable an increase in reparations to $250 per fortnight, he said.

Reparations remaining unpaid currently total some $80,000.

There is no detail around the level of supervision and how supervision would be carried out, Judge Clark said.

There is nothing in this proposal which gives absolute confidence that past behaviour would not occur again, he said.

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v. Wallace – District Court (12.11.25)

26.008

Corporate Governance: Jenner v. Corrections Association

  

Within one month of Glen Jenner’s election as vice-president of the prison officers’ union, his stated intention to shake-up current union policy resulted in attempts by the old guard led by union president Floyd du Plessis to remove him from office in a manner the Employment Court ruled was in breach of natural justice and was illegal.

Old butted heads with new, in what amounted to a major upheaval following Corrections Union elections in 2025.

Already a member of the union’s 24 member executive committee, Mr Jenner was elected vice-president at the union’s 2025 elections on a platform promoting a need for change in current direction, spending, bargaining approaches and priorities.

He works at Rimutaka Prison, near Wellington.

At time of this election, Mr Jenner was already under threat of disciplinary proceedings.

In general, it is alleged Mr Jenner has undermined union executives and was disruptive at executive committee meetings.

Following Mr Jenner’s election as vice-president, Mr Du Plessis refused to deal with him in person, unless a witness was present.  Mr du Plessis supported a union executive resolution having the effect of allowing Mr Jenner to act only on directions from himself as president.

Those holding office as vice-president are an active member of the executive, Judge Beck ruled.  Their role is not to simply act as a delegate for the president.

Steps were also taken to have Mr Jenner removed from office as vice-president on grounds of ‘just cause.’

In the Employment Court, Judge Beck ruled that the fact of Mr Jenner taking legal action against his own union, challenging its disciplinary procedures, could not amount to ‘just cause.’

The union also failed to comply with rules of natural justice, she ruled.

Disciplinary complaints against Mr Jenner were not sufficiently itemised.

In addition, there was a risk of bias in any decision by the executive committee for his removal from office as vice president, Judge Beck said.

Judicial impartiality is not expected, but those considering his removal must come to the question with an open mind and be amenable to persuasion after hearing the evidence, she said.

Members of executive committee who proposed the resolution for Mr Jenner’s removal have already signalled their decision.  They should not participate in the vote, Judge Beck ruled.

With an Employment Court ruling now clarifying the ground rules, both the current disciplinary action against Mr Jenner and his potential removal as vice president have yet to be decided.

Jenner v. Corrections Association of New Zealand Inc – Employment Court (7.11.25)

26.007

Disclosure: Liao v. Liao

 

A High Court order that daughter Pei-Ya Liao surrender ownership of an Auckland house to her parents was only the start.  Entitled to compensation for costs of construction, Pei-Ya said contract terms for the fixed price build is sufficient evidence.  Her parents want evidence of actual costs.  With the build carried out by a company part-owned by Pei-Ya’s husband, her parents are suspicious that side-deals saw the build completed for much less than the contract price, reducing compensation payable.

Their compensation dispute followed litigation commenced back in 2021, resulting in a High Court ruling that a property on White’s Way in Ellerslie was held in trust by Pei-Ya for her parents.

They had provided cash to buy a bare section, with title taken in Pei-Ya’s name to circumvent rules prohibiting foreign nationals from owning residential land.  D&T Homes Ltd, a company controlled by her husband, built a house on the site, paid for by Pei-Ya and her spouse.

Ownership was disputed.  Pei-Ya claimed the land was gifted to her; part of a family arrangement, she says.  At the time, she owned at least two other investment properties.

The High Court ruled there was no gift; Pei-Ya held the Ellerslie property in trust for her parents.  While having to surrender the property, she was entitled to compensation for the cost of building a house on the bare section, the court ruled.

Her parents demanded proof of actual costs.

Builder D&T Homes refused to release any detail.

Pei-Ya’s husband said their Ellerslie build took place during the covid-19 pandemic.  Building materials were in short supply.  D&T Homes scavenged stock from multiple sources, which was stored in bulk, and then used across several building sites with no detailed records kept allocating supply costs across various jobs.

Justice van Bohemen ordered D&T Homes disclose all relevant accounting information necessary to determine ‘actual costs’ of the Ellerslie build.

The fact D&T Homes as builder is closely linked to Pei-Ya makes made full disclosure necessary.  He cautioned against D&T Homes making unnecessary redactions to invoices, obscuring suppliers’ details.

Information provided is to be kept confidential, Justice Bohemen said.

D&T Homes alleges that if this information is made widely available, Pei-Ya’s brother would improperly use this information in operating his rival construction business.

Liao v. Liao – High Court (7.11.25)

26.006

Deadlock: Nahkle v. Karaka Estate

 

With transactions in excess of seventeen million dollars in dispute, the High Court ruled companies owned by the Auckland Nahkle family can face liquidation because of a management deadlock, overriding in-house rules requiring family disputes first go to arbitration.  Matriarch Henriette Nahkle alleges son Daniel has misappropriated family money; he claims a 2015 family agreement gave him control over company business assets. 

Family riches came from property development, later reinvested in land around Kingseat in South Auckland held in the names of Karaka Estate Ltd and Byerley Park Ltd.  Mother and son are directors.

Byerley Park currently runs a horse breeding and training facility; trading at a loss, the High Court was told.

Henriette alleges Daniel has failed to properly account for his use of family funds.  In turn, Daniel says all disagreements were resolved back in 2015, with an agreement giving him ownership of family assets.

The breadth and effect of this 2015 agreement is disputed.

Subsequently, Henriette blocked transfer of any further family funds to Daniel.

A 2024 mediation failed to resolve family differences.

When Henriette took Companies Act steps to wind up both Karaka Estate and Byerley Park on ‘just and equitable’ grounds, Daniel claimed this was premature; family trust deeds require their ongoing dispute first to go to arbitration, he said.

Associate Judge Brittain ruled an arbitration clause might see the High Court defer a liquidation hearing, but such a clause cannot override Companies Act rights to seek liquidation.   

It is not clear how any issues suitable for arbitration could be defined in this case, he said.  Management is deadlocked, with an irretrievable breakdown of trust between mother and son as directors.

He ruled their dispute be set down for a Companies Act hearing, to determine whether liquidation of the two companies is needed to resolve the deadlock.

Nahkle v. Karaka Estate Ltd – High Court (6.11.25)

26.005

Asset Forfeiture: Commissioner of Police v. Allen

 

Pleading guilty to charges of cannabis supply, William James Allen then faced a proceeds of crime application seeking to sell a suite of six properties he owns in Wellington, Napier and Hastings all mortgaged to ANZ Bank.  In a structured sell-down akin to corporate restructuring, the High Court approved a self-managed asset realisation with Allen agreeing to hand over $1.3 million as proceeds of crime. 

Whilst admitting to dealing in cannabis, Allen disputes that his property purchases were funded in any way by proceeds of crime.  Nevertheless, he agreed to a court-approved Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act settlement in which he will self-manage sale of as many properties as may be needed to generate $1.3 million payable as proceeds of crime.

It was earlier agreed that $1.08 million was generated from illegal cannabis sales.  The amount payable to settle the proceeds of crime claim was increased to $1.3 million, to cover the contingency that Allen may not sell properties as promised, forcing further action by police to recover payment.

Terms of the High Court order give Allen time to make full payment: August 2026.

All six properties are currently subject to restraining orders.

Allen’s lawyer was empowered to liaise with Insolvency Service to have restraining orders lifted sequentially on properties as they are sold.  His lawyer was further empowered to liaise with Insolvency Service to temporarily lift restraining orders over properties not being sold but requiring refinancing to accommodate ANZ Bank’s lending criteria.

Net proceeds of each sale are to be handed over in reduction of the court approved settlement.

Justice Churchman ruled that any properties remaining after full payment of $1.3 million are removed from restraint and return to Allen’s full control.

The restrained properties are: (in Wellington) at Wainuiomata and Lower Hutt; (in Napier) at Maraenui; (and in Hastings) at Flaxmere.

Commissioner of Police v. Allen – High Court (6.11.25)

26.004

Family Trust: Darlow v. Pilbrow

 

Holding up distribution of a $2.5 million family trust, Anne Pilbrow was warned failure to promptly file her claim in court alleging wrongdoing by an Auckland lawyer as trustee meant she would get trust legal costs to date charged against her share, resulting in some $22,000 deducted from her final payout.

Final distribution of the Pilbrow Property Trust was delayed first by a dispute over Owen Pilbrow’s will, and second by Anne Pilbrow’s demand to be compensated for what she claims are currency exchange losses.  She lives in Australia.

Mr Pilbrow died in 2020, survived by nine children.

Another daughter, Vicky, challenged potential distributions from both his will and the trust.  She was unsuccessful in a 2024 Family Court hearing on her Family Protection Act claim against her late father’s estate; her plans to sue the trust were settled out of court in 2022.

The way was now open to wind up both Mr Pilbrow’s estate and his Pilbrow Property Trust.  His nine children are equal beneficiaries of both the estate and the trust. 

The High Court was told daughter Anne mounted a letter-writing campaign against Pilbrow trustee, Auckland lawyer Chris Darlow, complaining that exchange rate movements in the intervening years had cost her in excess of AUD 64,000.  This was later extended to allegations by her that Mr Darlow concealed financial information and manipulated trust finances.

All these allegations are denied.

She sent letters of complaint to the High Court and threatened to write to the Law Society and the Ombudsman.

Mr Darlow said distribution of $2.5 million trust assets could not be finalised until this dispute was sorted out.

In the interim, Mr Darlow paid out her eight siblings their $277,000 share, paying Anne a reduced sum of $200,000 while holding back the balance as security towards his costs as trustee.  The Pilbrow trust deed gives trustees a right of payment out of trust assets for expenses incurred as trustee.

A Trusts Act notice was served on Anne in Australia giving her 90 days to make progress, filing in court her claim against the trustee seeking damages.  She failed to do so.

The High Court subsequently ruled she was barred from later filing any claim.

A Trusts Act 90 day notice is designed to cut through any impasse, forcing claimants to start legal action or lose the right to sue.

The court order also stated the trustee’s ongoing legal fees of $22,000 are to be deducted from the balance of $77,000 still to be distributed to Anne as her share of the Pilbrow Trust.

Darlow v. Pilbrow – High Court (3.11.25)

26.003

Loan: Gemmell v. Gemmell

 

When Libby Reilly’s nine year relationship with Rewi Gemmell came to an end, it was a complete surprise to be told nearly thirty per cent of their Coromandel home was owned by Rewi’s father.  The High Court later ruled Arthur Gemmell’s financial contributions to their home were interest-free loans and could not be construed by Maori custom as giving him ownership rights.

The High Court heard evidence of Arthur Gemmell seeking to be scrupulously fair as between his children, ensuring they shared equally in getting financial support; a practice which undermined later claims he was part-owner of Libby’s and Rewi’s family home.  

While working as a builder at Hahei on Coromandel peninsular in 2009, Rewi purchased land funded with a bank mortgage and $80,000 put in by his father, Arthur.  A year later, Arthur provided another $20,000 to help fund purchase of a relocatable house shifted to the site, used by Rewi and Libby as their family home.

With their relationship at an end, Rewi claimed his father had a 28 per cent equity interest in the property.  This reduced the value of Libby’s relationship property claim over the family home.

Father and son claimed there was an oral ‘ownership agreement’ between them, having Arthur’s cash contributions creating an ownership interest.  This flowed from Maori tikanga, they said; Maori custom for some hapu recognises that a father’s financial support for a son to buy property sees the father part-owning that property.  For Maori, multi-party ownership is the norm within ancestral landholdings.

In court, the paperwork did not match this supposed family understanding.

The $20,000 payment in 2010 was matched against a bank deposit reference as being a ‘loan…interest free.’  Subsequent $20,000 payments by Arthur to his son, used to help paydown his bank mortgage, were similarly described as loans, with interest payable at 2.5 per cent.

The court was told Rewi did pay interest for a period, then stopped.

There was no documentation for the initial $80,000 advance.

Arthur subsequently signed a new will which stated this $80,000 contribution was an interest free loan to Rewi, and that on Arthur’s death this benefit was to be taken into account when distributing his estate between his two children.

Evidence was given of an excel spreadsheet named ‘house equity.xlsx’ set up by Rewi in 2010 detailing house ownership in proportion to cash put in by Arthur, Rewi and another relative, since repaid.  Forensic evidence indicated this spreadsheet was in fact created in 2010.

Justice Anderson ruled Rewi was aware from the outset that the $80,000 contribution from his father was a loan.  No trust arrangement existed such that Rewi held part-ownership on behalf of his father.

Tikanga may have influenced how Rewi viewed family interests over the property, Justice Anderson said, but the written evidence was that of a loan by Rewi’s father, with Rewi as the sole owner.

The $100,000 contributed by Arthur as interest-free on-demand loans is now repayable given that Arthur has made demand for payment, she ruled.

This debt arose out of purchase of a family home.  It is a relationship debt, repayable before any split of relationship property.

Gemmell v. Gemmell – High Court (31.10.25)

25.229

Trade Mark: APEDA v. Patent Office

 

Following disputes over use of the name ‘champagne’ and then ‘manuka honey,’ now it is the turn of basmati rice with India seeking to have sales of Pakistan’s basmati rice blocked in New Zealand.

New Zealand imports over one thousand tonnes of basmati rice each year, primarily from India and Pakistan. 

Back in 2019, India’s Ministry of Commerce made Trade Marks Act application to register a certification trade mark for basmati rice.  If approved, only basmati rice produced in India could be sold in New Zealand.

India’s Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) said registration of ‘basmati’ in New Zealand is needed to identify its product as having recognised quality standards.

Consumers see Trade Marks Act certification marks every day, having little understanding of their origin: the “Made in New Zealand’ symbol; the ‘Woolmark’ symbol; the Heart Foundation’s ‘tick’ symbol.

This certification has economic value, making promises as to a product’s source and/or quality.

Owner of a certification mark can block suppliers using the mark in New Zealand without permission.

A legal campaign by French winegrowers now sees use of the word ‘champagne’ in respect of wine applying only to product produced in a specific region of France using specific grape varieties, excluding competitors in New Zealand from using the same name.

New Zealand honey producers were not so successful in attempts to claim monopoly rights to manuka honey products.  The name ‘manuka honey’ is descriptive, but not distinctive to New Zealand alone.  The same product is produced in Australia from its own native flora.

India’s APEDA application claiming a certification mark for its basmati rice was unsuccessful; it faced the same legal issue as manuka honey.

Basmati rice is a type of rice, not distinctive to India alone.

APEDA appealed Trade Mark office refusal of certification.

In the High Court, Justice Boldt offered APEDA the opportunity to amend its application to allow basmati rice from Pakistan to also use the basmati name in New Zealand.

APEDA indicated that it might allow ‘legitimate’ Pakistan suppliers to use the name to describe its product when sold in New Zealand.

This concession was insufficient, Justice Boldt ruled.

APEDA’s application was dismissed.

Across the Tasman, the Australian Trade Mark office has refused APEDA’s similar application for basmati trade mark certification.

Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority v. Commissioner of Trade Marks – High Court (30.10.25)

25.225

Contract Hire: Ester Electrical v. Lynx Recruitment

 

Belatedly reading the fine print in Lynx Recruitment’s six page terms and conditions, Auckland company Ester Electrical subsequently learnt it could not refuse to pay when complaining staff provided by Lynx were incompetent, stuffing up a Parnell apartment build requiring remediation work costing some $290,000.

Lynx provides skilled staff as requested by clients for short-term work.  Lynx terms and conditions specifically exclude liability for any damage caused by on-hire staff and require invoices be paid without set-off within seven days.  Payment on time, with arguments sorted later, is the tenor of Lynx’ contract.

Lynx took steps to put Ester Electrical into liquidation for unpaid invoices totalling $130,000.

Ester refused to pay, claiming some of the electricians supplied by Lynx Recruitment were incompetent.  Their work had to be redone.

In the High Court, Associate Judge Lester said it is common practice in commercial contracts to prohibit set-offs, forcing clients to pay immediately even when there is an ongoing dispute, still unresolved.

Lynx Recruitment is within its rights to impose robust ‘no set-off’ rules, he said.  The fact Ester Electrical signed these terms and conditions without reading is of no relevance.

Judge Lester ordered Ester Electrical pay the outstanding $130,000 invoice within three weeks, or face liquidation.

He dismissed Ester’s claims that false CVs supplied by staff meant Lynx made false and misleading statements about the competence of staff provided, in breach of both the Consumer Guarantees Act and the Fair Trading Act.  Neither of these statutes apply to services provided for businesses by Lynx when sourcing skilled staff, Judge Lester said.

Lynx terms and conditions specifically exclude liability for what an individual may have incorrectly claimed on their CV.

Ester Electrical Ltd v. Lynx Recruitment Ltd – High Court (30.10.25)

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