Arbitration: Vector v. Contact Energy

In a first for New Zealand, players in the natural gas market have been forced to release details of their confidential supply contracts so that industry competitors can better determine market prices in setting their own long-term contract prices.

Shell Petroleum and Todd Petroleum are currently in arbitration with Vector Gas over prices for ongoing long-term supply. These three asked the High Court for an order that ten other named players in the industry release details of their own terms of supply.  Those named include Contact Energy, Genesis Energy, Mighty River Power, Trustpower, Greymouth Petroleum and NZ Oil & Gas.  There was resistance to handing over this information.

Justice Kos granted the orders, subject to tight rules.  Data provided is to be kept under tight security in the litigation departments of the three law firms acting in the arbitration.  Information supplied is to be used for purposes of the arbitration only, and for no other purpose.  Staff using the data is required to sign confidentiality agreements.

There is a public interest in the Shell/Todd/Vector arbitration setting a market price based on a more complete picture of the market for natural gas sales in New Zealand, His Honour said.  While parties to the arbitration have access to a substantial amount of market data, that information is materially incomplete.  Shell and Todd currently control 69 per cent of wholesale gas sales.  As purchasers, Vector and Todd have about 55 per cent of the market for industrial, commercial and residential users.

The Arbitration Act allows parties in any arbitration, with court approval, to demand relevant information from outside parties.  Justice Kos said the advantage of this procedure is that it enables industry experts to analyse data prior to arbitration.  The Shell/Todd/Vector arbitration is set down for hearing in April 2015.

Vector v. Contact Energy – High Court (5.12.14)

14.056

Caveat: CIT Holdings v. Glover No.2 Trust

Real estate valued in excess of $10 million is the focus of a drawn out battle between estranged husband and wife.  She complains he is trying to get a sneaky advantage buying up the properties cheaply; he complains she took out loans against the properties for personal spending.  The High Court refused to remove caveats lodged by the wife to block any immediate sale.

A string of adjoining properties in Auckland’s suburb of St Heliers is owned by a company called CIT Holdings.  CIT holds title as a bare trustee.  The beneficial owners are interests associated with estranged couple: Gregory Martin Olliver and Sarah Patricia Sparks.

The High Court was told ten residential properties in Waimarie Street, St Heliers were purchased in 2009 for a total of $10.4 million.  Plans for redevelopment were hindered by Mr Olliver getting into financial difficulty then putting an insolvency scheme to his creditors.  Evidence was given that Mr Olliver’s and Ms Sparks’ relationship subsequently deteriorated.  They separated mid-2012.   Ms Sparks had been in sole control of the Waimarie Street  project during Mr Olliver’s financial difficulties.  She transferred title for some of the properties into a trust she alone controlled and used these assets as security for further borrowings.  This included some $152,000 borrowed for her own personal use.  It took a series of court cases in 2013 to force Ms Sparks to return the transferred properties to CIT Holdings.

Purchase of the Waimarie Street properties was funded with a $6.75 million loan from the Bank of New Zealand.  By early 2013, the Bank was taking steps to force a mortgagee sale.  The loan plus interest arrears and legal costs had ballooned out to $10.1 million by late 2014.  In addition, liability for GST amounting to $2.9 million is claimed by Inland Revenue.

The Court was told attempts to sell by tender failed.  There was interest in individual properties, but no interest in all properties being offered collectively as a job lot.

An early 2014 valuation obtained by CIT Holdings valued the properties collectively at $10.5 million on a sale at market, but $8.4 million if sold in a forced sale.  CIT Holdings invited Ms Sparks to make an offer which would satisfy the Bank.  No offer was made.  Two months later, interests associated with Mr Olliver offered to buy at $10.5 million.  Any sale to Mr Olliver was blocked by caveats lodged against the property titles by Ms Sparks’ trust.  CIT Holdings applied to have the caveats removed.

Associate Judge Osborne ruled the caveats should stay.  Ms Sparks’ trust has a beneficial interest in the profits from any sales by virtue of a 2009 joint venture agreement governing the Waimarie Street development.  He said it was grounds to remove the caveats if there were to be no profits from a sale.

Little by way of profit for the joint venture was likely with the offer promoted by Mr Olliver at $10.5 million.  Additional interest and costs on loans are running at some $2000 per day.  Ms Spark alleged the $10.5 million offer undervalued the properties.  Recent Auckland City rating revaluations valued the properties in aggregate at $16.9 million.   The court was told an objection has been lodged to this valuation.  Judge Osborne said he cannot be completely satisfied that the properties’ current market value is as low as $10.5 million. 

Meanwhile, the caveats remain and a sale at $10.5 million to interests associated with Mr Olliver is blocked.

CIT Holdings v. Glover No.2 Ltd – High Court (5.12.14)

14.055

Family Trust: Kite v. Hodge

The High Court intervened in an intergenerational dispute over the operation of two Hamilton family trusts.  The father was held to be in breach of trust by approving payment of capital distributions to himself.  The High Court removed all trustees and appointed the Public Trust as trustee to oversee the trusts’ operations.

The court was told a wide ranging dispute had developed between several members of the Hodge family, including Mr Graeme Hodge (the father) and two children, David Hodge and Jan Kite, over the operation of two family trusts: the David Hodge Trust and the Kite Family Trust.  Both trusts owned Hamilton properties.

Formed in 1996, the David Hodge Trust owned a house at 24 McFarlane Street, Hamilton.  Graeme Hodge engineered a reorganisation of the Trust’s structure in July 2006 by selling the house at its then market value to a newly formed trust.  A mortgage over McFarlane Street was cleared with funds extracted from the Kite Family Trust.  A resolution by trustees of the David Hodge Trust declared that a capital distribution worth some $107,000 be made to the father Graeme Hodge.  This reorganisation had resulted in the sale of the house and repayment of the mortgage with the value of the equity payable to the father alone.

Justice Lang ruled that Graeme Hodge acted in breach of trust by approving payment of the capital distribution.  The trust deed governing operation of the David Hodge Trust prohibited Graeme as beneficiary from voting as trustee in approving any distribution to himself.

The second trust, the Kite Family Trust, owned a motel at 265 Te Rapa Road.  In July 2006, Graeme Hodge arranged that motel be sold to another, newly formed, trust.  The new trust was capitalised sufficiently to pay off a mortgage over the motel and leave a surplus.  This surplus was used to pay off a mortgage on the McFarlane Street property and to make a capital distribution to Graeme Hodge – a capital distribution believed to be in the region of $439,000 though no precise figures were before the court.  Again, this reorganisation had resulted in the sale of a major Trust asset with the equity in that asset winding up in the hands of the father alone.

Justice Lang again ruled that Graeme Hodge had acted in breach of trust by approving payment of this capital distribution.  The trust deed for the Kite Family Trust does not prohibit trustees voting to make distributions to themselves as beneficiary.  The trust deed allows trustees to make Trust decisions by majority vote, provided all trustees are given the opportunity to either vote or voice their opinion.  One trustee for the Kite Family Trust, son David Hodge, was in Ireland at the time the resolution was passed.  His father used a power of attorney to sign on David’s behalf.  Justice Lang said while father Graeme could sign as power of attorney on his son’s behalf, that did not negate an obligation required by the trust deed to get his son’s opinion as trustee before the vote.    The court was told Mr Hodge was in regular contact with his son while he was living in Ireland.  He did not get his son’s views on the proposal.  Should his son disagree with the proposed capital distribution, the trust deed required that Graeme Hodge step aside and not vote on the trustees’ resolution.

The court removed all trustees from the two trusts, appointing the Public Trust as sole trustee of each trust.

Kite v. Hodge – High Court (1.12.14)

14.054

Fair Trading: Commerce Commission v. Wild South

In giving leave for a criminal prosecution against Wild Nature (NZ) Ltd to continue, the High Court has warned directors against putting their companies into liquidation to avoid potential liability for fines.

Wild Nature pleaded guilty in late 2012 to Commerce Commission charges that it breached the Fair Trading Act by falsely labelling alpaca, merino and southdown wool duvets as being New Zealand made.  These products were sold to tourists from China, Korea and Taiwan brought in by tour operators.

Seven other companies were also convicted.  They were fined between $22,000 and $200,000.  Before Wild Nature could be sentenced, the company was put into voluntary liquidation.  Once liquidation has commenced, all legal proceedings against a company are stopped.  They require court approval to continue.   The Commerce Commission asked the High Court to allow the prosecution of Wild Nature to continue through to sentencing.  It said Wild Nature was the worst offender of the eight companies prosecuted.  Not only did the company mislabel the products’ origin, the company also manufactured false certificates to support the false labelling.  The Commission said these were particularly cynical breaches of the Act.  It would be seeking a fine in excess of the $200,000 penalty imposed on the second-worst offender.

Justice Venning gave leave for the prosecution to continue.  The company has pleaded guilty, only sentencing remains.  He said deterrence and denunciation are important considerations.  Wild South’s behaviour can have an adverse effect on the tourism trade.

Commerce Commission v. Wild Nature (NZ) Ltd – High Court (17.11.14)

14.053

Tax: Beacham v. Inland Revenue

A Hawkes Bay medical practitioner with a passion for restoring classic cars was hit with tax penalties after being held liable for tax avoidance. Together with his wife, they were found to have underpaid tax by some $674,000 on undeclared income of $1.7 million.  The High Court upheld Inland Revenue penalties at fifty per cent of the unpaid tax.

The court was told Dr Beacham transferred his medical practice in 1996 to a company later called Beacham Holdings.  Expenses for both his medical practice and his car restoration business were booked through the company.  The medical practice was profitable; the restoration business not.  Personal living expenses were also charged to the company.  Evidence was given that Dr Beacham’s drawings and expenses charged to the company had reached $1.07 million by November 2006.  In the 2007 year, Beacham Holdings declared taxable income of some $558,000 but was sitting on retained profits of about $1.8 million – a sum taxable if declared as a dividend.  A tax consultant suggested some corporate restructuring to get rid of the contingent tax liability.  This was implemented.  A shell company was formed with Dr and Mrs Beacham as 50/50 shareholders.  The shell company purchased their shareholding in Beacham Holdings for $1.8 million.  To pay for the shares, a series of accounting entries were used to have the shell company’s liability to pay Dr and Mrs Beacham for the shares set off against the Beachams’ overdrawn current account of $1.07 million with Beacham Holdings.  The end result saw the Beachams’ potential tax liability arising from the overdrawn current account in Beacham Holdings converted tax free into a capital investment in the new shell company.

The Taxation Review Authority upheld Inland Revenue’s view that this corporate restructuring was tax avoidance and that the $1.7 million credit generated against their overdrawn current account was taxable as a deemed dividend.  The High Court upheld Inland Revenue’s assessment of tax payable at some $674,000 with penalties at fifty per cent.

The High Court was told the Beachams are taking legal action against their tax consultants: Markhams and Tax Assist Ltd.

Beacham v. Inland Revenue – High Court (14.11.14)

14.052

Contract: Smith v. Jones

For him the alias is Smith; for her the alias is Jones: judicial disguises used in the High Court to discreetly hide identities of the successful businessman and the sex worker disputing ownership of a $500,000 advance.

Recently widowed, Mr Smith met Ms Jones at a massage parlour.  Over the subsequent four years their relationship moved from a purely commercial arrangement for sexual services to that of a sugar daddy and his mistress.  The court was told Mr Smith arranged for regular payments into her bank account of between $5000 and $2500 per month.  She accompanied him to social events, the theatre and concerts.  He met her son and paid for mother and son to travel overseas to visit their home country.  He bought her clothes, jewellery and an expensive car.  He paid $50,000 for renovations to her house and made a flat available for her son at a modest rental.  At Ms Jones suggestion, they began looking for a business investment. Ideas canvassed were a business or an investment property to rent out.  The intent was to provide a secure financial future for Ms Jones.  Nothing suitable was found.  Evidence was given that in December 2012 Mr Smith created a $500,000 term deposit in Ms Jones name.  Mr Smith was to describe this deposit as an expression of good faith, as a substitute for the purchase of investment assets originally planned.  Two months later their relationship ended with Ms Jones claiming the $500,000 deposit was a gift; Mr Jones claiming it was a loan.

Justice Andrews ruled that the term deposit was not a gift, it was a conditional loan.  There was an implicit agreement between the two that the loan was conditional on their relationship continuing and in the interim Ms Jones was entitled to interest accruing on the term deposit.  Her entitlement to the money ended when the relationship ended.  Ms Jones was ordered to repay the $500,000 advance together with all interest earned on the term deposit as from April 2013.

Smith v. Jones – High Court (30.10.14)

14.051

Real Estate: Maketu Estates v. Robb

An estate agent’s failure to tell his client that a second potential buyer was interested in a Maketu kiwifruit orchard cost PGG Wrightson $1.1 million; the extra amount the property could have sold for but for the misleading advice given the vendor by the agent.

Maketu Estates Ltd sold its Bay of Plenty 66 hectare kiwifruit orchard in November 2012 for $3.8 million.  It had been a tough two years for the industry and for local real estate agents: PSA bacterial disease had badly affected production, farm incomes and land values.  Kiwifruit packhouses were scrambling to get fruit for their production lines and were buying up orchards to ensure a guaranteed supply of fruit.

Maketu Estates sold to a local packhouse: DMS.  Maketu learnt days after the sale that a rival packhouse MPAC had also been interested.  The High Court was told that hours before DMS shook hands on the deal MPAC was still showing interest as a serious buyer, phoning the Wrightson agent for clarification of what was included in the sale.  MPAC was left with the impression there was no rush, while in fact the agent was at that time meeting with directors of Maketu prior to a final meeting with DMS.  The agent did not tell Maketu’s directors that another buyer was still keen.

Directors of Maketu Estates said at no time were they advised that MPAC was in the market and proposing to make a bid.  Having competing bidders would inevitably push up the price.

Justice Woolford said evidence indicated that Wrightson’s agent told Maketu’s directors DMS was the only buyer.  And not telling MPAC that negotiations were underway between Maketu and DMS was deceptive and misleading, he said.  His Honour surmised that the Wrightson agent held a subconscious bias in favour of DMS.  The agent had a very good relationship with the packhouse, having done a lot of work for the company over the years.  By contrast he had no previous working relationship with the MPAC staffer he spoke to on the phone, had not taken him on an earlier view of the property and did not recognise the significance of his interest in the orchard.

Wrightson and its agent were held liable for a breach of the Fair Trading Act and for a breach of the duties owed a client.  Damages of $1.1 million were the difference between the price paid by DMS and the amount that could have been obtained in a competitive market.  Wrightson’s claim for $88,000 commission on the sale to DMS was dismissed.  Its agent had failed to act in the best interests of Maketu Estates.

Maketu Estates v. Robb – High Court (29.10.14)

14.050

Lawyer/client: Torchlight Fund v. NZ Credit

He was one of law firm Buddle Finlay’s most valuable clients generating fee income in excess of ten million dollars over a fourteen year period.  The knowledge gained about George Kerr was so detailed that the High Court barred the firm from acting for financiers chasing him for $A33.6 million.

Around 2009, businessman George Kerr established the Torchlight Group.  It specialises in purchasing distressed assets.  In 2012, Torchlight borrowed $A37 million short term through Australian financier Mr John Grill to acquire debt from Bank of Scotland International.

The High Court was told this $A37 million loan was for 60 days only.  Repayment of principal was late, being paid progressively through 2012 and 2013.  The Australian financier is now demanding further payments for interest, fees and penalties accruing at the rate of $500,000 a week – a demand now in excess of $A30 million.  Torchlight has gone on the attack, saying late payment fees claimed are an unenforceable penalty.

Learning that Buddle Finlay was to act for the financier against Torchlight, Mr Kerr applied to have the law firm removed from the case.  He said Buddle Finlay knows all about his personal circumstances and business methods having worked for him for over a decade.  This is confidential information which the law firm should not be allowed to use against him.  Should Torchlight be held liable, it is likely the financier will chase him personally for money due, he said.

The law firm said any possible misuse of confidential information was “fanciful or theoretical”.  Justice Gilbert removed Buddle Finlay from the case.  Disqualification was the only effective way of avoiding any risk of the firm acting against Mr Kerr and his business interests, he said.  The financier argues Torchlight had the benefit of independent legal advice before taking up the short term loan.  This is legal advice provided earlier by Buddle Finlay itself.

Torchlight Fund v. NZ Credit – High Court (17.10.14)

14.049

Family trust: Harre v. Clark

It was the views of an 86 year old matriarch that won out in a dispute over the sale of eleven hectares of valuable land on the outskirts of west Auckland owned by a family trust.  The High Court ruled she did not act improperly when removing her daughter and a local solicitor as trustees following arguments over the method and timing of any sale.

The Harre family established a family trust in 1989 which took ownership of eleven hectares of farm land on Totara Road, Whenuapai.  The land is not economic as a farm, but has been used to run dry stock.  Now worth millions, its value is expected to increase as Auckland expands.

The Trust land is all that remains of a farm which has been in the Harre family since the 1860s.  At age 86, Lois Harre is the oldest living descendant.  Her descendants and their spouses are named as beneficiaries of the Trust.  The court was told there had been a family meeting in late 2009 with general support for a sale.  Dissension followed within the family about what should happen: one daughter looking for an immediate sale; a son looking to wait and subdivide later before selling.

Matters reached a head when two of the trustees, daughter Lynette Clark and solicitor Colin Lucas took steps to market the property and it was listed for auction in March 2012.  The auction was cancelled following objections by matriarch Lois and a son, Roderick.

Evidence was given that Lois then used her power of appointment in the Trust deed to appoint herself and son Roderick as trustees.  Colin Lucas was removed as trustee at the same time.   When daughter Lynette objected, she too was removed as trustee.

The High Court was asked to rule on who were now in charge of the Trust.  The two dismissed trustees claimed to still be trustees and they claimed the appointments of Lois and Roderick were made for improper reasons.  It was alleged that Roderick was attempting to misuse his position as trustee to buy some of the land cheaply.  It was also alleged Lois was angling to continue using the Trust land.  The court was told she lives on an adjoining property.

The power in a trust deed to appoint and remove trustees must be used for a proper purpose, consistent with the purpose of the trust and in the best interests of the beneficiaries as a whole.  Justice Brewer described Lois Harre as a determined and formidable person.  He said the dismissed trustees had failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that the two new trustees had been appointed for an improper purpose.

Harre v. Clark – High Court (16.10.14)

14.048

Sth Canterbury Finance: R. v. Sullivan, White & McLeod

While Allan Hubbard, the autocrat controlling South Canterbury Finance, developed a sainted reputation as benefactor for good causes his finance company was desperately hiding the extent of problem loans by window-dressing its balance sheet.  By moving problem loans off balance sheet prior to balance date and taking them back later, South Canterbury presented a healthier picture than justified.

Mr Hubbard died in September 2011 following a car crash.  He left behind a finance company under government control following a $1.6 billion bailout and criminal prosecutions against former directors of the company and its chief financial officer.  Poor lines of control within South Canterbury Finance and weak accountability caused evidentiary problems for prosecutors trying to sheet home criminal liability.  A single director, Edward Oral Sullivan, was convicted. On a charge of deception in relation to a 2006 transaction, he was held to have deliberately misrepresented who was the end purchaser of shares in a Hellaby Holdings subsidiary in order to defeat operation of the Takeovers Code.  He was also convicted of Securities Act offences for material non-disclosures of related party lending.

The most serious criminal charge faced by directors was an allegation that they used false financial statements to get a 2008 government guarantee of South Canterbury investors’ deposits.  This charge was dismissed when there was no proof that the government actually relied on the financial statements when admitting South Canterbury to the guarantee scheme.

The then Labour coalition in New Zealand was blindsided in October 2008 when the Australian government suddenly announced a federal guarantee of depositor’s funds.  This was designed to calm investors’ nerves in the face of worldwide banking instability and the threat of a run by depositors on banks.  Two days later, the Labour government announced a similar guarantee scheme for New Zealand deposits to prevent a flight of investor funds to Australia.  Within 48 hours South Canterbury applied to join the scheme.  Approval was given three weeks later.

The High Court was told South Canterbury provided copies of its most recent audited financial statements in support of its application.  It was alleged that the figures had been massaged.  There was evidence that South Canterbury management had a history of window-dressing its balance sheet to hide the extent of asset impairment.  The prosecution described methods used as being “purposefully structured to hide high risk lending” and moving “beyond the cavalier to the dishonest”.  One internal South Canterbury finance memo talked of “cheque-swapping at balance date” and the creation of a “façade”.

Evidence was given that South Canterbury’s parent company, Southbury Group, would acquire problem loans from South Canterbury shortly before balance date.  This removed any need to disclose the impaired loan which was now replaced in South Canterbury’s records with the injection of new funds to replace the non-performing debt.  After balance date the transaction would be reversed.  Asset impairments were understated as a result.  Management had no incentive to manage non-performing loans when they were being hidden from analysts and investors.  Any complaints within South Canterbury about the practice were waved away in autocratic fashion by Mr Hubbard.  Attempts by the auditor to keep tabs on what amounted to related party lending proved ineffective.

One example of window-dressing described in the High Court was false accounting entries made ten days before balance date in 2009 recording a fictitious transaction between Southbury, South Canterbury and Kelt Finance Ltd.  South Canterbury supposedly was advancing $10 million to Kelt Finance which in turn lent $10 million to Southbury which in turn paid $10 million to South Canterbury.  The effect of this fictitious money-go round was to misleadingly reduce related party indebtedness between Southbury and South Canterbury by $10 million and hide the fact that South Canterbury was in breach of loan limits with Southbury.

Justice Heath ruled that even if the financial statements used to obtain a government guarantee of investors’ funds were false, there was no evidence that the government relied on these financial statements before granting the guarantee.

There was evidence that in October 2008 there were such grave concerns about a total financial collapse that finance companies were being admitted to the scheme with minimal prior checks.  Government did not decide which financial organisations would be given a guarantee; that decision was delegated to the secretary of the Treasury.  The court was told applications were sent to the Reserve Bank for analysis.  Bank analysts gave a “negative assurance” in respect of South Canterbury’s application: they had no reason to believe it should not be approved.   The final decision remained with Treasury and was at the discretion of the secretary of the Treasury.  Evidence was given that there was no written record of reasons why the secretary of the Treasury gave approval for South Canterbury to be admitted.  He was not called to give evidence at the trial.

R. v Sullivan, White & McLeod – High Court (14.10.14)

14.047

Lease: Cornwall Park Trust v. Chen

Increased rents demanded by Cornwall Park Trust on its leased properties look to be too high when no bids were received for a Maungakiekie Avenue property abandoned after the annual rental increased 900 per cent.

Cornwall Park Trust Board in Auckland took a hard line against one leaseholder who abandoned her property after a twenty one year rent review raised the annual ground rent to $73,750.  She was liable to pay the cost of refurbishing the property up to standards demanded by the lease.

Young Xin Chen has been in dispute with Cornwall Park Trust after annual rent for her property jumped in 2009 from $8300 to $73,750.  She purchased the property at 21 Maungakiekie Avenue, Epsom in 2005 for $450,000 when the lease had four years to run before the next rent review.  Many properties in the area are owned by the Trust and leased on perpetually renewable, long-term ground leases known as “Glasgow” leases.  Leaseholders enjoy rights of occupation, while the Trust has residual ownership: in economic terms, the lessor’s interest is like a bond secured over the land with the value of the bond reset with each 21 year rent review.  Rentals are recalculated with each rent review at five per cent of the freehold property value excluding the value of improvements to the property.

The court was told Mrs Chen disputed the increased rental, retaining possession of the property for the next two years before surrendering the keys.

The Maungakiekie Avenue home was put up for auction by the Trust.  Terms of the lease entitled Mrs Chen to compensation for the value of the house and garage situated on the land if the property sold at auction.  No bids were received.

Evidence was given that the Trust subsequently refurbished the property to what it called “executive standard”, then rented out the property at a rate which is about two-thirds the $73,750 annual rental demanded of Mrs Chen.

The Trust Board sued Mrs Chen claiming lease payments at the new higher rate for the two years she remained in possession following the rent review and also claiming costs of repairs to the house.

Justice Ellis ruled that Mrs Chen was liable for two years rent at the old rate only.  Her Honour did not accept the Trust’s arguments that the lease required Mrs Chen to pay two year’s rental at the new higher rate and that she had lost her entitlement to compensation for the value of the house and garage.

Justice Ellis ruled that Mrs Chen was liable to pay some $119,000 for the Trust Board’s costs in getting the property to good order and condition.  Mrs Chen was in breach of lease terms requiring her to maintain the property in good condition and to repaint the house every five years.  The house was built in the 1920s.  It was no defence for Mrs Chen to say the house was in poor condition when she purchased it.  There was evidence that Mrs Chen had stripped from the house vanity units, doors and the stove before surrendering possession to the Trust Board.

The Trust Board did not seek to recover from Mrs Chen its cost in refurbishing the property above and beyond that required by the lease in order to have the house fitted out to an executive standard.

Cornwall Park Trust Board v. Chen – High Court (8.10.14)

14.046