24 April 2015

Insolvency: Timberworld v. Levin

The Court of Appeal has ruled against the “peak indebtness rule”, the rule favoured by liquidators attacking payments made through a running account because it claws back from creditors the maximum amount possible.
Liquidators challenging preferential payments meet heavy resistance from creditors of an insolvent company fortunate to be paid prior to liquidation.  Creditors paid in full do not want to repay money received in return for a minimal or non-existent payment out of the unsecured creditor pool.
In 2006, company law was amended to deal with the issue of “running accounts”: the commercial practice where supplier and customer run a current account with no clear delineation between charges for goods or services supplied and subsequent payments.  Should the customer later go into liquidation insolvent, it is difficult to identify which payments should be clawed back as a preferential payment.  Insolvency law seeks to equalise payments to unsecured creditors, permitting a liquidator to claw back payments made prior to liquidation and made at a time when the customer was insolvent.  Liquidators can claw back payments made up to two years prior to liquidation.
The Court of Appeal was told liquidators have been using what is called the “peak indebtedness rule”.  This involves looking at the state of the current account between customer and creditor for the entire period the customer was insolvent, going back up to two years.  Having identified the point within this time period when the amount owed was at its highest (the peak indebtdeness), liquidators then treat any reduction below this peak up to the point of liquidation as being a preference having to be repaid.  Creditors criticise the peak indebtedness rule as being totally arbitrary and being designed to maximise the amount clawed back.
The Court of Appeal said liquidators have been wrong in using the peak indebtedness approach.  Instead, liquidators must identify the first point when a company was insolvent and use as their starting point for recovering payments as preferential the later of: two years prior to liquidation (if the company was then insolvent) or the start date of the business relationship if this relationship commenced during the two year period (again presuming the debtor company was then insolvent).  Only if there is a reduction in indebtedness between this starting point and date of liquidation are there grounds to claim there was a preferential payment.   
The court said the peak indebtedness rule is in conflict with the plain wording of the Companies Act.  The Act was applied in two cases heard together on appeal.
Timberworld Ltd was challenging a claw back demanded by the liquidator of an insolvent customer, Northside Construction Ltd.  Northside was proved to be insolvent in the two years prior to liquidation and had carried on trading whilst insolvent.  Northside operated a running account with its supplier, Timberworld.  During the two year period, indebtdness with Timberworld peaked at $95,569.  On liquidation Northside still owed $47,650.  Using the peak indebtedness rule, the liquidator claimed $47,963.  The Court of Appeal ruled the liquidator could recover only $29,490 as a preference: the reduction in the current account calculated between the start and the finish of the two year period.
In a second case, liquidators of Tarsealing 2000 Ltd unsuccessfully appealed a High Court ruling that Z Energy was not required to repay $293,555 received for bitumen supplied.  Tarsealing had a trade account with Z Energy for a 17 month period before being put into liquidation by Inland Revenue.  The trading account opened with a zero balance due, peaked at $293,555 and dropped to a zero balance when the debt was paid in full before the company went into liquidation.  The starting point within the two year period was zero when the trade account was opened, and was again zero at liquidation.  With a net difference of zero between the two points there was nothing for the liquidator to claw back.
Timberworld Ltd v. Levin – Court of Appeal (24.4.15)
15.038